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I General introduction 
Two of the most important informal financial institutions in Ethiopia, the iqqub 
and iddir, have remained the preserve of anthropologists and sociologists. The 
only serious available economic analysis of the informal sector is that of Mauri 
(1987) and Girma Begashaw (1978), which brought to light the nature and 
relative economic importance of this sector in Ethiopia. However, there are 
still different aspects of the sector which need further investigation. For 
instance, no attempt has so far been made to identify and characterize the 
iqqub and iddir. The literature to date has focused only on urban areas and has 
neglected the informal sector in the rural areas. Little empirical evidence has 
been generated to substantiate the possible linkage between the formal and 
informal sectors. Moreover, no attempt has been made to investigate the 
household characteristics of participants in the informal and semi-formal 
sectors. The semi-formal sector (i.e. savings and credit co-operatives), in 
particular, is an area that has hardly been treated by researchers. 
The basic purpose of this study is to generate empirical information on the 
informal and semi-formal financial sectors in Ethiopia with a view to 
improving our understanding of their economic importance. In so doing, it is 
hoped that the above-mentioned gaps in the literature can be filled. The study 
focuses on the iqqub and iddir in the urban and rural areas and on the savings 
and credit co-operatives. 
Two basic approaches were followed in generating the data required for this 
study. First, the relevant institutions (i.e. the iqqub, iddir and credit 
co-operatives) were studied. For this purpose, questionnaires were prepared and 
addressed to the leadership of the institutions concerned. In addition, 
interviews were conducted and documents investigated. The same procedure 
was followed in both urban and rural areas. Second, household surveys were 
undertaken to study the characteristics and opinions of the participants. In 
addition, the participant-observation method was used to generate 
complementary information. 
The case study approach was taken as the basic method for generating the 
required data. The major case study was of Addis Ababa University (AAU). 
The university was selected because it has perhaps the largest work-place iddir 
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and one of the most outstanding savings and credit co-operatives in the 
country. There are numerous iqqubs organized by employees of AAU. All 
types of workers, from labourers to professors, are represented in the 
university, and accessibility and cost factors are favourable to all. 
The AAU is located in the capital city of the country where most of the 
banking and insurance facilities are located. Within AAU, we focused on the 
Sidist Kilo Campus where 66% of the employees are found. A survey was 
conducted of 6.3% of the employees of AAU in Addis Ababa. The sampled 
employees were almost proportionately selected from both academic and 
administrative staff. The administrative staff comprised professional science, 
administration, trade and crafts, custodial, manual, clerical, and financial. 
Questionnaires were directly distributed by the researcher or by his 
assistants among all employees willing to co-operate (almost 99% of those 
approached). After sorting out and rejecting defective responses, the sample 
size came to 162 employees. The questionnaire consisted of 46 questions and 
was divided into four parts. Part 1 dealt with general questions concerning 
household socio-economic and demographic characteristics. Part 2 was about 
the iqqub, Part 3 about the iddir and Part 4 about the AAU savings and credit 
co-operative. The data was analyzed by classifying the sample employees into 
three income groups, viz., low-income, medium-income and high-income 
groups. These categories were identified by using a simple technique. The 
reported incomes were first listed in an ascending order and then divided into 
three equal parts. The bottom class constituted the low-income 'group, the 
middle constituted the medium-income group and the top class constituted the 
high-income group. The survey of the employees of AAU is used as an 
important source of data for the three institutions considered here, i.e. the 
iqqub, iddir and savings and credit co-operatives (SACCs). In this paper this 
survey is referred to as 'the survey'. Data on big traders' iqqub were generated 
through interviews with leaders and members of the iqqub. Questionnaires 
were prepared and administered for this purpose. The data on small traders' 
iqqub were also generated in the same way. The technique for data collection 
on iqqub in the rural areas is described in Section II. The data on the structure 
of the iddir were generated through a survey of 32 iddirs in Addis Ababa. The 
questionnaires were given to leaders of different types of iddirs. Data for 
SACCs were generated, mainly through interviews with officials of the Savings 
and Credit Co-operatives Development Office and committee members of the 
individual SACCs. The other major sources of data are documents and 
publications. The researcher.has also gained from his personal experience as 
a long-time member of all three financial institutions discussed here. 
The surveys were undertaken between November 1990 and April 1991. The 
rest of Section I reviews the structure and shortcomings of the formal sector 
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and the raison d'être of the informal sector. Section II deals with the literature 
review concerning the conceptual framework, historical origins, procedure and 
economic importance of iqqub as well as case studies of different types of 
iqqub. Section III deals with the iddir. Section IV discusses the conceptual 
framework and the international dimension of SACCs and sets the stage for the 
case studies by discussing the origins and development of SACCs in Ethiopia. 
It further discusses the linkage between iqqub, iddir and SACCs. Each part of 
the paper begins with an introduction and ends with a summary and 
conclusion. Section V concludes by discussing the implications of the main 
findings presented in the preceding parts. 
Mention of the limitations of the study is also in order. The traditional 
money lender, though an important component of the informal sector, has not 
been empirically investigated in the study. It is extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to generate data on usury, a practice which is considered illegal, 
immoral and secretive. 
The conclusions to be drawn from this study are subject to the limitations 
in the data base. Definitive conclusions can be made only on the basis of 
further research. 
The formal sector 
Credit during the pre-revolution period in Ethiopia was characterized by 
concentration of bank operations in few urban centres (e.g. Addis Ababa alone 
accounted for 64% of the bank branches), high collateral and minimum loan 
requirements which favoured big businessmen, and the virtual neglect of the 
agricultural sector. By 1974 agriculture had received no more than 10% of the 
total bank credit in spite of the fact that the sector had accounted for more 
than 50% of the GDP (National Bank of Ethiopia, 1975, pp. 29-41; Haimanot 
Asmerew, 1990). 
The post-1974 period saw the nationalization and consolidation of various 
types of banks into specialized banks: National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE), 
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE), Agricultural and Industrial Development 
Bank (AIDB) and Housing and Saving Bank (HSB). The NBE, being the 
central bank of the country, is responsible for issuing currency, planning and 
co-ordinating all banking activities, formulating monetary policies and acting 
as a financial arm of the government. The CBE, the biggest bank in the 
country, is primarily responsible for the mobilization of domestic savings and 
for extending loans to all commercial activities. The AIDB extends short, 
medium and long-term loans to the agricultural and industrial sectors and, 
more specifically, to the formal sector. The HSB concentrates on activities 
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related to building, including private dwellings. Detailed descriptions of the 
banking system in Ethiopia have been written by other reseachers (Mauri, 
1967; Caselli and Mauri, 1986; Yeshitla Yehualawork, 1989, pp. 383-406; 
Haimanot Asmerew, 1990; Assefa Admassie, 1987; Mahtsentu Felleke, 1989). 
In addition to the banking system, the Insurance Corporation and pension 
contributions can be mentioned as organized financial intermediaries in the 
country. The place of the above-mentioned banks in the Ethiopian economy is 
shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 Financial flows in Ethiopia 
Source: Mauri, 1987. 
Sectors in surplus Intermediaries Sectors in deficit 
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The financial intermediaries in Ethiopia are highly biased in favour of the 
socialist sector of the economy. For example, the loan interest rate is 7% for 
individual farmers and private enterprises and 6% for state and collective farms 
(NBE Credit Regulation NBC/CR 1). Most of the agricultural loans of the 
AIDB (89%) go to state farms which account for not more than 5% of the 
total agricultural output, while the private peasant sector receives an 
insignificant amount of loans (less than 1%) (Haimanot Asmerew, 1990, p. 
54). Existing credit policies of the government have contributed to limitations 
in the farm household's access to formal sources of credit. 
In recent years, the CBE has attempted to reach the rural population by 
increasing the number of bank branches from 86 in 1974 to 147 in 1986 (NBE, 
1975, p. 31; Yeshitla Yehualawork, 1989, p. 399; Mahtsentu Felleke, 1989). 
However, in a country where three quarters of the rural population live a day's 
walk from the nearest all-weather road, it can be said that the 'savings in 
Ethiopia are only mobilized from urban population and organizations' (Yeshitla 
Yehualawork, 1989, p. 399). 
The total deposits of the banking system (NBE, CBE, AIDB and HSB), in 
1986/87 amounted to bin 4.3 billion, of which demand deposits were 60% 
(NBE, 1986-87, P. 27). 
The major sources of credit for the bulk of the rural population are friends 
and relatives. According to the 1983-84 Agricultural Survey of the Ministry of 
Agriculture (Ministry of Agriculture, 1984), friends and relatives had 
accounted for as high as 78% of the total credit extended to the peasant sector 
during the survey period; the rest of the credit had originated from the formal 
sector through peasant service co-operatives (19%) and 'local merchants' (i.e. 
money lenders, 3%).' 
The village-level financial market in Ethiopia is interlinked with other 
markets as noted by Wibaux who intensively studied a sample of six farm 
households for one whole year in the eastern part of the country: 
The farmer Ke got a sack of potatoes on credit, to be repaid in grain 
after the harvest. Either he did not pay it back, or the repayment was 
not recorded in the monitoring. Ke has negative credit balance. He does 
not actually lend money. He gave a goat to his sister to sell for him. 
The same is more or less true for T who slaughtered one of his goats 
giving half of the on credit to one neighbour who still owes him 
50 Bin (1986, p. 127). 
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The informal sector2 
The great bulk of the Ethiopian population makes little or no use of the formal 
savings and lending institutions. In a country where more than 80% of the 
population lives in rural areas, the few banks and credit associations that are 
presently operational are limited to urban areas. Moreover, these banks are 
little used even by the urban population. The per head deposit for the total 
population in 1985-86 is not more than bin 90. 
The question now is 'why does the population not effectively use the formal 
sector?'. In the first place, it should be noted that households have a low 
capacity to save mainly because of the low level of per capita income in the 
country. In addition, the political and social climate in the country is not 
sufficiently conducive to savings mobilization (Mauri, 1987, p. 5). In the 
second place, limited savings mobilization through the informal sector may be 
traced to two related factors: the inability of the formal financial institutions 
to attract households and household reluctance to use these institutions. 
The formal institutions, which are transplanted from industrial countries, 
seem largely inappropriate to Ethiopian realities. High costs per transaction, 
complex bureaucratic lending procedures, elaborate paper work, high collateral 
requirements and delays are some of the factors which militate against 
effective utilization of the existing banking facilities. Moreover, the low 
interest rate (6%) offered to savers does not provide an incentive to the public. 
On the other hand, households may be reluctant to use the formal sector due 
to lack of confidence in the banking system, lack of information, and age-old 
social norms. For example, in a study that covered a sample of members of a 
rotating saving club (i.e. iqqub, see below) the following opinions were 
expressed concerning the formal sector: 
Members, when asked about it, usually explain that they resent the 
intricacies of the process whereby money is obtained from a bank, 
especially awkward questions on their financial background. Less 
consciously, they reveal a preference for loans secured on a mutual 
basis which satisfy their self-respect, rather than a one-way process 
which hurts their pride (Comhaire, 1966, pp. 45-46). 
On the other hand, the informal financial sector, as shown by studies 
undertaken in developing areas (Bouman, 1977; Chandavaskar, 1985; Miracle 
et a!., 1980; Bouman and Houtman, 1988), and as will be suggested by the 
Ethiopian case below, has certain advantages over the formal sector. The 
average scale of operation and the cost of lending and recovering is small; 
there is freedom of entry and exit and freedom from de jure and de facto 
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central banking control; information-gathering is kept to the minimum while 
trust and first-hand knowledge of a participant are important; the purpose of 
credit is for both consumption and investment (see Bouman and Houtman, 
1988, pp. 69-70). 
The nature and procedure of the informal financial sector in Ethiopia has 
been extensively described (Pankhurst and Endreas Eshete, 1958; Asfaw 
Damte, 1958, pp. 63-76; Comhaire, 1966; Alemayehu Seifu, 1969; Mekuria 
Buicha, 1973; Aleme Feyissa, 1973; Cohen and Koehn, 1980, pp. 166-67; 
Baker, 1986; Mauri, 1987). 
Although it is not the subject of this study, a brief review of the literature 
on money lenders seems in order. The literature on traditional money lenders 
is scanty, the only study being that of Mauri (1987, pp. 13-16); what follows 
draws heavily from this study. The money lender (known as arata-abadari) 
has been active in Ethiopia for centuries and until the beginning of the 
twentieth century represented the only source of loans. Condemned by the 
church, outlawed by the state and frowned upon by society, the money lender 
kept his financial dealings secret and kept no account open to scrutiny. With 
the adoption of socialism3 as a declared guideline of the government, the 
money lender has increasingly gone underground. Nevertheless, the crippling 
of the official economy has created a thriving market for the money lender. 
Mauri noted: 
In the towns, reduced lending by the financial institutions has created 
a potential for the development of informal lending because even 
persons who in the past were familiar with bank credit now turn to 
money-lenders to replace bank loans (1987, p. 14). 
Prior to 1974, money lenders were often rich landowners. Today, following the 
nationalization of land, landlords have disappeared as a social class, and their 
roles as money lenders are being replaced by rich traders. The financial 
operations of money lenders are simple, cost-effective and flexible compared 
to those of the banking system. Interest rates, which are never stated in the 
agreement made with the borrower, are influenced by the extent of personal 
relations, degree of risk involved, availability of funds in the community, 
length of the maturity period and extent of competition from the formal 
financial market (Mauri, 1987, pp. 13-16). There is no adequate information 
on the size of the interest rate. According to a survey undertaken some years 
back, it ranged from a minimum of 24% to a maximum of 900% per year 
(Mauri, 1987, p. 15). The bank's lending interest rate varied from 4.5% to 
9.5% per year depending upon the type of project and borrower (whether 
co-operative, state enterprise or individuals). 
8 RESEARCH PAPER 21 
In some cases, the credit market, as noted by Mauri, is interlinked with the 
product market. 
According to widespread custom in certain agricultural districts of 
Ethiopia, for example, in the coffee-producing districts around Jimma 
and Gore, the merchant-lender pays the cultivator a sum of money 
which represents both a loan and an advance payment for the purchase 
of a given quantity to produce after the next harvest. The unit price is 
established by the merchant-lender in the advance payment on the basis 
of the price of the previous harvest or of the estimated price of the next 
one, duly discounted (1987, p. 16). 
II The iqqub 
ntroduction 
The iqqub, an institution which has remained the preserve of anthropologists 
and sociologists (Asfaw Damte, 1958; Comhaire, 1966; Baker, 1986), has 
received little attention from economists. The only serious economic analysis 
of the iqqub is that by Mauri (1987). The purpose of Section II is to identify 
and characterize the different types of iqqub, explain household characteristics 
of participants of iqqub, characterize iqqub in rural areas and identify the 
linkage between iqqub and other financial institutions. The economic 
importance of the iqqub is further established on the basis of empirical 
evidence. This is important because some people doubt the economic 
importance of the iqqub. For example, Comhaire (1966) asserted that: 'On 
economic grounds, the iqqub can hardly be regarded as a productive 
institution. It satisfies a spirit of gambling, rather than that of true saving'. 
This section focuses on the following questions: Does the iqqub involve 
genuine savings? How are the relative and absolute size of contributions to the 
iqqub affected by household characteristics? Are there distinct types of iqqub? 
Do all participants benefit equally from involvement in the iqqub? Is iqqub 
money used for productive purposes? How is the iqqub characterized in the 
rural areas? 
In the literature, the iqqub is conceived as a form of traditional savings 
institution. Levine (1972, p. 278), for example, described it as a form of saving 
association in which weekly or monthly payments of a fixed sum are 
exchanged for the privilege of receiving a large sum at some point in the life 
of the group. To Mauri (1987, p. 8) it belongs to the type of traditional 
financial institutions which are included under savings associations. Still others 
(Baker, 1986, p. 163) describe the iqqub as a saving club combining a bank 
and lottery. These descriptions suggest that the iqqub is a savings association 
where each member agrees to pay periodically a small sum into a common 
pool so that each, in rotation, can receive one large sum. All savings and loan 
associations with a rotating fund 'have savings as a core feature', according to 
Miracle et a!. (1980). 
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The credit aspect of the iqqub can be treated within the framework of 
financial intermediation. The economic logic underlying the widespread use of 
the iqqub can be approached in two ways. The traditional approach analyses 
iqqub in the framework of financial intermediation as it is the case with similar 
Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs). A new approach analyses 
ROSCAs (and hence the iqqub) in terms of 'the logic of collective action' 
(Callier). 
According to the first approach, financial transaction is undertaken 
implicitly through the borrowing and lending activities of the participants. With 
the exception of the last recipient, all others borrow from each other for a 
varying period of time btit borrow at zero interest rate (a negative interest rate 
if there is inflation). Opportunity cost is involved for those participants having 
opportunities for investment. The essence of this approach is that: 
all members switch at some point in the cycle from a position of net 
saver to a position of net debtor, except the first person to collect the 
kitty (who is a net debtor throughout the cycle) and the last one (who 
is a net creditor throughout) (Callier). 
This approach is common in the literature (e.g., see Miracle et a!., 1980). 
Although logically valid, the approach does not fully explain the emergence 
and specific features of ROSCAs in general and of the iqqub in particular. 
According to the second approach developed by Callier: 
to the participants, the ROSCAs are more like a pooling of resources 
needed to gain the benefits of some kind of collective action ... than 
like a combination of contracts involving mutual loans and debt service 
payments: the logic of the ROSCAs is the logic of collective action, 
not the logic of the market hence the idea that interest rate 
considerations are a secondary aspect of the arrangement, absent from 
the original concept of the classical ROSCAs. 
Focusing on the tontines (meaning ROSCAs in francophone Africa), Callier 
argued that: 
The creation of a tontine is one of the most obvious Pareto 
improvements that people who save in order to purchase a bulky asset 
can create for themselves in a society with fragmented capital market. 
The Pareto improvements are seen in terms of the reduction of the waiting 
time required to purchase a bulky asset: 
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The pooling of resources reduces the time of 'waiting' before the 
purchase for all participants except the one who is last collecting the 
kitty (who nevertheless does not have to wait more than if he had 
saved alone). 
Callier has stated the implications of this interpretation of tontines as follows: 
• The incentive to participate is directly related to the adequacy of the kitty 
relative to the contemplated purchase; 
• There is little incentive to participate in more than one cycle of the same 
tontine; 
• The tontine loses its raison d'etre when capital market segmentation 
vanishes as a result of market integration; access to credit at the prevailing 
market rate solves the problem of lumpy expenditures. 
The iqqub has perhaps evolved over centuries out of ancient customary 
institutions (e.g. community-level labour exchange arrangements), although 
some writers (e.g. Pankhurst and Endreas Eshete, 1958, pp. 355-56; Comhaire, 
1966) attempted to trace its origins to the period of the Italian occupation, 
1936-41. Moreover, it is possible that the iqqub pre-dates the emergence of the 
modern banking system in the country. 
The organizational set-up and procedures of the iqqub are described in 
detail in Mauri (1987, pp. 8-13), Asfaw Damte (1958), Pankhurst and Endreas 
Eshete (1958), Aspen (1989) and Comhaire (1966). Only a few points are 
noted here. 
The iqqub is based on pre-established social ties. It consists of 
homogeneous groups: people from the same work place, ethnic background, 
trade, schooling background or neighbourhood. People from all walks of life, 
ranging from the rural poor to the urban rich, from shoe-shine boys to high 
level government officials, participate in the iqqub, and the capital 
contributions vary according to the purpose of the iqqub and the economic 
status of its members (see Baker, 1986, p. 166; Landuber Araya, 1983, p. 64; 
Comhaire, 1966; Aspen, 1989). In a sample survey undertaken in 1960, it was 
estimated that 60% of the respondents belonged to one or more iqqub 
(Comhaire, 1966, p. 44). In some cases, iqqub may be paid either in kind or 
in labour as in the case of women's mutual support networks in Wollaita 
(Dessalegn Rahmato, 1989, p. 20; see also Wibaux, 1986, p. 89; Altaye Alaro, 
1991). 
The growth of the modern financial sector during the second half of the 
century did not reduce the importance of the informal financial sector, the 
iqqub. Both sectors have been developing along parallel lines. The recent 
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attempt by the Insurance Corporation to sell policies to iqqubs has utterly 
failed.7 Why do people prefer iqqub to the formal financial sector? According 
to Arnaldo Mauri (1987), the major reasons are the following: 
• The intimate integration between the financial services offered by the iqqub 
and the strengthening of the ties of solidarity and friendship in the group; 
• The forced savings of a contractual nature; 
• The provision of credit services particularly suited to the needs of the 
participants and the flexibility and adaptability of the iqqub to various 
situations and needs; 
• The low risk of default; 
• The low or practically non-existent costs of administration and transactions; 
• The absence of minimum investment threshold; 
• The probable tendency to gamble on the part of the members and the 
consequent attraction which the lottery holds for them; 
• The secrecy which surrounds the iqqub and the member's involvement in it. 
The iqqub in urban areas: cases from Addis Ababa 
Table 1 presents the results of the sample survey of employees of Addis Ababa 
University. The extent of and reasons for participating in iqqub are discussed 
below. An average of 48% of the sample employees (n = 162) reported that 
they currently participate in iqqub. The responses to the questions do you 
join the iqqub?' and 'why do you prefer the iqqub to the banking system?' are 
revealing. Respondents gave different answers to the open-ended questions. 
Most of the respondents reported that the iqqub, vis-à-vis the banks, facilitates 
forced saving by imposing self-discipline on the saver. One respondent, for 
example, stated: 
My monthly income is low. I am ashamed of going to the bank with 
a small sum of money. Moreover, I procrastinate until I discover that 
I have no more savings to deposit in the bank. On the other hand, the 
iqqub imposes self-discipline on me. 
Another respondent said: 
I do not have time to go to the bank and deposit my savings. Banks are 
located far away from where I live or work. I have never paid much 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14 RESEARCH PAPER 21 
A number of respondents indicated that they may squander their bank savings 
on trivialities. Iqqub money comes at the right time and in large quantity; the 
chances of squandering it are limited. Timeliness is one advantage that is. 
mentioned many times. Some respondents also reported that they get 
interest-free loans from the iqqub. Some reported that they do not have enough 
information about the banking system. There are those who said that bank 
operations involve bureaucratic procedures. 
A number of respondents stressed the social aspect of the iqqub. A person 
in financial difficulties could ask friends to set up an iqqub for him and 
surrender the first lot to him. A person refusing to co-operate with a needy 
friend or work-mate may incur rejection by the community. That is perhaps 
why one respondent said, 'I am forced by my friends to join the present 
iqqub.' To summarize, the main points the respondents raised in favour of the 
iqqub are timeliness, self-discipline in saving a large sum of money, simplicity, 
flexibility, accessibility and fulfilment of social obligations. 
Certain interesting patterns are observed regarding the savings behaviour of 
samples from different income groups. The extent of participation in the iqqub 
(averaging 48%), systematically increased with income while the proportion 
of income allocated to the iqqub systematically fell as income rose (Table 1). 
Of the low-income group, 41% of the sample employees participate in the 
iqqub. The corresponding ratio for the medium-income and high-income 
groups is 48 and 56%, respectively. However, average contributions to iqqub, 
as a percentage of household income, systematically dropped from 24% for the 
low income group to 11% for the high-income group. Similarly, average 
contributions to iqqub as a percentage of per capita income dropped from 96% 
in the low-income group to 48% in the high-income group. This result is 
consistent with findings regarding the village-level study (see below). 
However, average contributions per participant systematically increased from 
birr 53 for the low-income group to bin 194 for the high-income group. 
It has been observed that a person sometimes participates in more than one 
iqqub. The average number of iqqub, which is non-responsive to changes in 
the income level, was 1.4. This finding is again similar to our findings in the 
village study (see below). 
MOre than 70% of the respondents reported that they participate in monthly 
iqqubs at the work-place (Addis Ababa University). The number of participants 
per iqqub, which averaged 11 persons, is very small compared to big traders' 
iqqub and village-level iqqub.8 
The total collections per iqqub, averaging bin 1,319, systematically 
increased from bin 396 in the low-income group, to bin 2,314 in the high- 
income group. An average of 95% of the responding sample employees 
reported that there were no deductions made from the kitty. The remaining 5% 
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reported that they surrender a portion of the kitty to the group and the money 
is used to cover expenses on drinks. 
The relationship between the iqqub and banks was also investigated. The 
use of banks by those who participate in the iqqub increased with income. Of 
the participants of iqqub who responded to the question, 'have you ever 
deposited iqqub money in the bank?', an average of 27% responded positively. 
This proportion systematically increased from 9% for the low-income group 
to 39% for the high-income group. Reasons for depositing the kitty in the bank 
are also given. Most of the respondents reported that they keep their 
collections in the banks as a reserve for precautionary purposes. The second 
important reason was the desire to get interest and thus to augment their bank 
deposits. Another important reason mentioned was the non-coincidence of the 
time of collecting the kitty and the time of the planned expenditure. That is, 
bulky assets or other materials may not be available at the time of collection 
of the kitty. Moreover, expenditure on such items as building of a house is not 
a one-time act; expenses are incurred in small amounts over time. The kitty is 
kept in the bank either wholly or partially, for a few months. 
Participation in the iqqub does not necessarily preclude a person from 
borrowing from the banks. Of those participants who responded to the 
question, 'have you ever borrowed money from bank?', 36% responded 
positively. The proportion of borrowers in the total number of respondents 
systematically increased from 24% in the low-income group to 59% in the 
high-income group. The amount of money borrowed from banks, averaging 
birr 15,635 per person, increased from bin 4,457 in the low-income group, to 
about bin 21 ,000 each in the medium and high-income groups. The single 
major reason for borrowing money from the banks is to build a private house. 
A small iqqub does not cover the costs of a modest house, although it may 
complement bank loans. The iqqub is generally used for the purchase of 
durables, payment of school fees, clothing, etc. 
The participants of iqqub were also asked if they ever settled a bank debt 
with iqqub money. Of the low and medium-income groups, none has done so. 
The proportion for the high-income group was 9% of those who responded to 
the question. 
One of the results of this study, that the proportion of income allocated to 
the iqqub falls as the latter rises, can be compared to other survey results 
(Table 2). The information given in Table 2 suggests that a rise in per capita 
income is invariably associated with a fall in the proportion of income 
allocated to the iqqub and similar voluntary associations. Does this suggest that 
the iqqub is a necessity for poor households? 
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Table 2 Monthly contributions to iqqutr. groups in Debarech Town 
Occupation 
Average income 
per month ($) 
Average 
contribution 
per month ($) 
Contributions 
as % of 
income 
Tela sellers 11.73 2.75 23.4 
Farmers 21.68 4.60 21.2 
Retired pensioners 31.27 2.59 8.3 
Municipal employees 77.90 2.31 4.2 
Policemen 99.58 2.00 2.0 
Teachers 219.17 6.47 2.9 
Source: Baker, 1986, p. 166. 
The big traders' iqqub is often fraught with secrecy. The author has 
encountered difficulties in collecting information about this type of iqqub. 
Three of the prospective informants that the author approached through friends 
not only declined to co-operate but were also furious at the idea. It was with 
great difficulties that data were gathered on the three case studies. 
Big traders 
The specific features of the big traders' iqqub are as follows. The total 
collection is very big. There are cases where the kitty amounts to a quarter of 
a million bin. The number of participants is high and the life of a cycle is very 
long. Membership is limited to a certain section of society, businessmen in 
particular. It is believed that most of the big traders' iqqubs are located in the 
market centre of Addis Ababa, the Mercato area. The lives of such types of 
iqqubs are quite long; they have a low degree of mortality. All members may 
not know each other; it is enough for a newcomer to be known by five or six 
participants who provide information regarding his credit-worthiness and also 
act as guarantors for him. The system of determining the order of rotation 
takes into account one of the basic economic principles, viz., the principle of 
opportunity costs of using a resource. They make extensive use of the banking 
system. The costs of transactions involving remuneration of officials and 
miscellaneous expenses are relatively high. Though basically 
business-orientated, the social interactions among members are strong. 
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Compared with other types of iqqub, the big traders' iqqubs are relatively 
institutionalized, complex and well-organized in terms of their procedures and 
lives. They operate on the basis of elaborate written by-laws. The following 
case studies illustrate the propositions given above. 
Case Study One. The first case study concerns perhaps the oldest iqqub in 
Ethiopia: the first cycle was initiated 45 years ago by Memhirie 
Wolde-Mariam, a clergyman from the Gurage ethnic group. Membership 
during the formative years of this iqqub was limited to 25 to 30 persons 
contributing from birr 1 to 3 each per week. Every time one cycle is 
terminated, another one starts afresh. The present cycle, initiated in September 
1989, consists of 170 members contributing birr 500 each per week. The total 
weekly collections amounted to birr 85,000 per winner. In addition to the birr 
500, members contribute a further birr 10 every week. This fund is used for 
two purposes: 85% is deposited in the bank as reserve in the account of the 
president of this iqqub. The reserve fund is used as a supplementary fund 
required to cover shortfalls arising from possible defaults by members. If there 
is any money remaining from the reserve fund after meeting emergency 
requirements, it is distributed among members at the end of the cycle. The 
remaining portion of the special fund (i.e. 15% of the birr 10 each collected 
from members each week) is spent on drinks served to members' during 
weekly meetings. Members also contribute birr 10 each at the beginning of 
each cycle for the purchase of stationery required for the iqqub. 
A new member is admitted into this iqqub after proving that he is known 
by at least five members. These persons are expected to be his guarantors. A 
member collects drawings upon presenting six guarantors. One reason behind 
presenting such a large number of guarantors is to spread the burden of 
covering defaults over as many persons as possible. Cases of defaults are, of 
course, brought to court. It is the duty of the president and the secretary to 
undertake the necessary litigation. The iqqub officials are paid salaries 
amounting to birr 500 each per month. This sum is roughly equal to the 
monthly salary of a fresh university graduate. Money required for salaries is 
raised by 'selling' lots, on a monthly basis, to a needy member. The 'price' of 
a lot is directly related to the length of the remaining life of the iqqub in a 
cycle, or to the expected waiting time. The 'price' ranges from 10 to 5% of the 
total collection. For example, a member who wants to 'buy' a lot at the 
beginning of the cycle pays birr 8,500 (10% of 85,000) while a member who 
wants to 'buy' it at the end of the cycle 'pays' bin 4,250 (5% of 85,000). It 
is also interesting to note that those members who collect the kitty late in the 
life of the iqqub are compensated; all members, except the first ten, are 
entitled to a premium of bin 500 each (in addition to the 85,000). The 
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premium is covered by collections from the 'sales' of iqqub. It should also be 
noted that a member winning a lot can 'sell' his lot to a needy participant. 
This iqqub has also a type of rudimentary insurance scheme in the form of 
iddir. In the event of the death of a member, all other members raise special 
funds and provide financial assistance to the family members of the deceased. 
A member whose business enterprise is destroyed by fire is entitled to 
immediate collection of the kitty free of charge. 
The money collected from this iqqub is used either for the establishment of 
a new business enterprise or for the expansion of existing ones. The kitty is 
often paid through the banking system with the president giving a cheque to 
the beneficiary. 
Case Study Two. The case of the second big traders' iqqub is as follows. There 
are 120 members contributing bin 404 every weekend. The total collected per 
week amounts to bin 48,484. The iqqub officials, numbering four, are paid a 
sum of bin 400 per week as a whole. The salary of the officials is raised by 
making deductions from the total collections of a member. A participant in 
need of money may 'buy' a lot. The 'prices' of a lot are again directly related 
to the length of the remaining waiting time. They ranged from 10% at the 
beginning of the cycle to 3% at the end of the cycle. The kitty is deposited in 
the bank until winners cash the cheques they receive from the president. 
This iqqub has encountered some problems of default. A member may not 
to pay his dues as a result of business failure or for other reasons. In that case 
guarantors are obliged to cover the default. However, the winner can collect 
the kitty on time as the shortfalls are reimbursed from the funds accumulated 
from the 'sales' of lots. The kitty could be kept in the bank for quite a long 
time in cases where a winner is unable to present the required number of 
guarantors. 
Case Study Three. The third big traders' iqqub consists of 41 members 
contributing bin 2,000 per month. The life of a cycle is thus 41 months. The 
total collection per month amounts to bin 82,000 per winner. But, about bin 
61 are deducted from the total collection and are used to cover expenses on 
drinks served to members attending the monthly meetings. In addition to the 
bin 2,000, members also contribute bin 50 each per month. This special fund 
is used to cover miscellaneous expenses. One such expense is the premium 
granted to the last person collecting the kitty. This person is not lending money 
to others at zero interest, rate; he is compensated consistently with the simple 
economic principle that money has opportunity costs. However, a considerable 
portion of that special fund is paid to the president and the secretary in the 
form of salaries. 
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The kitty is often deposited in the bank and the winner is given a cheque. 
The two major reasons behind this practice are that a winner may not get a 
guarantor on the day of collection of the iqqub and it is safer to keep such a 
large some of money in the bank. Cases of robbery of iqqub funds are 
common. There are also cases of winners being paid in cash in lieu of cheques 
because the president of the iqqub may not have a cheque at the time of 
drawing lots, and, moreover, some winners may not have confidence in 
cheques. 
Needy members may 'buy' the pooi every third month. During the first half 
period in the life of the iqqub, the selling price (payments required for 
transferring the pooi to another participant) is 8% of the total collection. Then, 
the rate is progressively reduced until it is the turn of the last person who 
obviously gets his collection without payment and without a guarantor. It is 
interesting to note that the rate at which a participant 'buys' a lot is 
presumably less than the rate of return on the investment to which the kitty is 
put. A portion of earning from 'sales' of a lot is used to cover shortfalls 
arising from defaults. Any remaining funds are distributed among all members 
at the end of the life of the cycle. Until then, the money is deposited in the 
bank in the personal account of the president. 
The screening process and admission requirements are strict. A necessary 
condition to be admitted to this iqqub is ownership of big property or 
especially the ownership of a business enterprise. A winner collects the kitty 
upon presentation of three to five guarantors. A winner who is unable to 
present guarantors could collect the kitty only at the end of the cycle. 
Guarantors covering defaults are granted priority in 'buying' the pool. 
The first cycle of the present iqqub was initiated around 1977. The 
termination of one cycle is followed by the beginning of another. There is 
often a lapse of time between the initial collection of contributions by the 
president and the drawing of the first lot; it takes time until the required size 
of membership is met and until all members pay their first contributions. In the 
meantime, the collections are deposited in the bank in the personal account of 
the president. 
The officials of the iqqub are interested in the re-start of another cycle. 
Therefore, they try to promote a good image of their own iqqub among the 
participants. For example, at the end of each cycle they hold a great feast for 
all the participants and distribute all residual funds available. This point 
suggests that a sort of competition exists among iqqubs in attracting new 
members or retaining old ones. 
Members appreciate the relative advantages of the big traders' iqqub. For 
example, a member of this iqqub told the present writer that he was able to 
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buy a truck and later a bungalow with iqqub money. He also said that iqqub, 
unlike a bank, imposes self-discipline in saving a large sum of money. 
Small traders 
A small traders' iqqub is set up by people engaged in small-scale business. 
This type of iqqub is common among people working in the informal sector. 
Membership is also open to salary and wage-earners. The kitty is of a small 
size. Unlike the big traders' iqqub, membership is often limited to people 
living in a neighbourhood. 
The case study iqqub is located in the midst of an area dominated by 
weavers. It was established more than nine years ago by neighbouring 
dwellers. Initially, the contribution per participant was bin 2 per week. 
Membership is not fixed; it rises and falls from cycle to cycle. Presently, there 
are 52 participants contributing bin 12 each per week. Those who lack the 
means to contribute bin 12 per week can pool resources and pay the full sum. 
The kitty amounts to bin 624. Every time one cycle is terminated, another one 
is started by more or less the same people participating in the previous one. 
The president and the secretary are paid bin 6 each per week. During the last 
eight years, they have taken two cases of default to court. For the last five 
years, the office of the secretary has been held by a school teacher. It is with 
money he got from this iqqub that he built a kitchen for his house. This iqqub, 
like big traders' iqqubs, operates on the basis of a written by-law. 
The iqqub in rural areas 
The iqqub is not limited to urban areas; it is also common in the rural areas 
though perhaps practised to a lesser degree. A national rural household survey 
by the Central Statistical Office (CSO) shows that the annual contribution to 
iqqub per household is bin 18.9 (Table 3). The per capita annual contribution 
is bin 3.75. The proportion of the annual household income allocated to the 
iqqub is 0.96%. On the other hand, the proportion of bank deposit in the 
annual household income is reported to be 2.04%. No clear-cut pattern has 
been observed regarding the relationship between household income and 
contributions to the iqqub (R2 = 0.2). This may be due to defects in the data 
base of the CSO survey. On the other hand, the survey suggests that the bank 
saving rates rise with broad income categories (see Table 3). 
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% of income 
deposit 
as % of 
income 
0 - 199 1.02 0.34 0.28 0.04 
200 - 299 5.79 2.21 1.87 0.25 
300-399 1.18 0.37 0.15 0.45 
400 - 499 5.71 1.55 0.99 0.73 
500 - 599 4.23 1.05 0.61 0.95 
600-699 5.77 1.47 0.61 0.70 
700-799 4.51 1.11 0.49 1.90 
800-899 6.87 1.59 0.71 1.50 
900 -1099 9.96 2.19 0.75 0.99 
1,100-1,299 9.68 2.03 0.61 1.23 
1,300-1,499 11.57 2.26 0.57 1.24 
1,500-1,699 15.48 2.85 0.73 1.10 
1,700-1,899 18.74 3.40 0.89 1.70 
1,900-2,299 18.64 3.22 0.78 1.83 
2,300-2,699 21.93 3.59 0.76 2.92 
2,700-3,499 97.01 15.73 2.63 2.83 
3,500-4,299 28.31 4.30 0.70 3.10 
4,300-5,099 15.37 2.33 0.38 2.94 
5,100-5,899 21.92 3.63 0.58 1.50 
5,900-6,699 8.85 1.20 0.20 4.82 
6,700-7,499 48.88 5.51 0.98 8.90 
8,000 + 39.46 5.56 0.48 4.65 
Average 18.92 3.75 0.96 2.04 
Source: CSO, 1988. 
One shortcoming of the CSO Survey is that it did not take into account the 
relationship between the iqqub and household socio-economic characteristics. 
The following case study of a village addresses this and related problems. 
Sina-Debre-Sina Village9 (Peasant Association), the case study village, is 
located along the Addis Ababa-Dessie highway in Maloud Woreda. The total 
number of member households of the Peasant Association was about 168 in 
1989. About 48 of them belonged to a co-operative farm named Gelila 
Agricultural Producers' Co-operative. Of the total land area amounting to 800 
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hectares, 131 hectares consisted of high quality land and forest land.'° The 
villagization scheme" was partially implemented in the peasant association. 
Some households, for one reason or another, did not move to the new village 
sites. The major crops grown in this rugged and degraded terrain are, in order 
of importance, horse beans, teff, field peas, wheat, barley and maize. Crop 
yield is extremely low. The village is a typically poor area in North Shoa. 
The data for the present study was generated through a household survey 
covering about 50% (n = 144) of the active farm households of the village.'2 
The reference period of the study was the agricultural year 1988-89. 
During the survey period, there were three separate iqqubs in the 
Sina-Debre-Sena Peasant Association. The weekly contributions per participant 
were birr 2 in each case. It was possible for a participant to get his (her) name 
registered as a member more than once depending upon his (her) ability to 
save. It was also possible for a person who could afford only birr I to join 
with another person to register as a member. 
Of the three iqqubs found in the area, the biggest one had 205 'members' 
of whom 79% were from the Sina-Debre-Sina Peasant Association. The length 
of one cycle was about four years. The weekly pool was birr 410. The second 
iqqub had 74 'members' of whom 39% were from the same peasant 
association. The pooi amounted to birr 148 per week. The third iqqub had 60 
'members' of whom 50% were from the same peasant association. The kitty 
amounted to birr 120 per week. It is interesting to note here that three separate 
iqqubs, with total weekly funds of bin 678, operate in a poor village consisting 
of not more than 160 households living in a mountainous area of less than 800 
hectares. 
All three iqqubs have written by-laws which define the procedure of the 
iqqub and the duties of the participants. The by-laws of one of the iqqubs have 
the following provisions. A winner should bring two guarantors upon receipt 
of the pool. Any participant failing to present guarantors is bound to collect his 
share at the end of the life of the cycle. Similarly, a participant with any 
defaults should collect the pool at the end of the life of the cycle. Deductions 
amounting to bin 5 per week are made from the poo1 as payment to the 
secretary and the president. Priority in collecting the pool is given to these 
officials. A participant in need of money could get the pool by paying bin 3. 
This is possible only once a month but a participant with serious financial 
difficulties (e.g. difficulties arising from the death of an ox) is entitled to the 
collection of the pool free of charge. This point suggests that iqqub involves 
not only business (money) relations but mutual assistance in time of difficulties 
(see iddir below). 
The household survey revealed that 50% of the sample households 
participate in iqqub. The weekly contributions amounted to an average of bin 
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2 per household. The two major purposes for joining iqqub are consumption 
and investment objectives (see Table 4). Here it is interesting to note that 
although consumption purposes are mentioned most of the time, investment 
purposes are mentioned 35% of the time in a poor village where people live 
a hand to mouth existence. 
It was also reported that iqqub is sometimes used for a totally different but 
interesting purpose. Iqqub itself is pledged as a security to a non-member 
creditor who has a claim on a member. This involves a written agreement by 
the president of the iqqub to the effect that he would reimburse the creditor 
from the kitty accruing to the member in the event of default. 
Table 4 Purpose for joining iqqub in the study village 
Purpose 
Number of times 
a purpose is 

























Payment of compulsory 5 7.4 
contributions 
Source: Village Household Survey 
The relationships between the types of peasant organizations and household 
characteristics, on the one hand, and the iqqub, on the other hand, are indicated 
in Tables 5a and 5b. The degree of participation in iqqub is the same for both 
villagized and non-villagized households. However, contrary to the theoretical 
expectation that households with higher economic status have a higher average 
propensity to save, the villagized households, in spite of their higher economic 
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ones (bin 2.20 per household) (see Table 5b). Two of the major indicators of 
the household economic status are volume of crop output (331 kg for 
villagized versus 262 kg per household for non-villagized households) and 
number of livestock (4.2 Tropical Bovine Units TBU for villagized versus 
3.8 TBU for non-villagized households) (Table 5b). Interestingly enough, the 
same pattern of saving behaviour is reported with respect to the other 
categories of household (i.e. members and non-members of the co-operative 
farm and male-headed and female-headed households). Members of the co- 
operative farm, despite their high participation in the iqqub (52.4% versus 
48.6% for non-members), contributed only bin 1.5 per household per week 
against bin 2.60 for the non-members. In contrast, members of the co- 
operative farm, with 1.34 ha of land per head (non-member 0.96 ha), 380 kg 
of food grains (non-members = 249 kg) and 4.7 TBU of livestock 
(non-members = 3.4 TBU) appear to be 'richer' than the non-member (private) 
peasant households. Similarly, female-headed households, though invariably 
poorer than the male-headed households, save more in the form of iqqub (see 
Table 5b). In fact, the highest level of participation (70% versus an average of 
50%) is reported by women (Table 5a). Women do not have enough land and 
labour to depend wholly on farming activities. They resort to the preparation 
and sales of local spirits and beer for survival. They tend to save a portion of 
their meagre incomes in the form of iqqub. 
Summary and conclusion 
The preceding pages have attempted to identify and characterize the distinct 
types of iqqub that exist in Ethiopia. Each type of iqqub has its own specific 
features. The big traders' iqqub, for example, is different from other types of 
iqqub in many ways. First, it has strong linkages with the banks. Second, its 
operations are based largely upon the logic of the market; it is 
business-orientated. Third, it has developed sophisticated mechanisms for 
compensating those members with longer waiting time for collecting the pool. 
Fourth, its transaction costs are considerable. Fifth, its operations are quite 
complex, formalized and institutionalized. However, it still maintains its 
cultural appropriateness. For example, elements of the iddir are involved in its 
operations. 
The extent of participation in the iqqub is affected by household 
characteristics. For example, poorer households have access to the iqqub and 
not to the banks. Better-off households use the banking system more than 
poorer ones. People from different age groups and levels of education 
participate in the iqqub. 
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The relative advantages of the iqqub over the banking system have been 
identified. The sample participants stressed the importance of self-discipline, 
timeliness, flexibility and collective action arising from participation in the 
iqqub. The study has thus largely confirmed Mauri's (1987) observations 
regarding the relative advantages of the iqqub. 
The study suggests that the iqqub does make economic sense. Those who 
doubt the economic importance of the iqqub should have a second thought. 
There are no indications that the iqqub involves a spirit of gambling apart from 
the eagerness to get the waiting time reduced. The study suggests that people 
join iqqub not to satisfy their gambling spirit but to meet clearly defined 
financial and social obligations. 
The iqqub is not limited to urban areas only. Even the rural poor have 
savings potential. The iqqub could be used as a launching pad for savings 
mobilization schemes (such as savings and credit co-operatives) in the rural 
areas. 
The study has revealed that a person can participate in more than one cycle 
of a given iqqub. In other words, there may be incentives to participate in 
more than one cycle of the same iqqub. It is also possible for a person to 
participate in more than one iqqub at any given time. 
The study suggests that an increase in the size of the iqqub is associated 
with an increase in the costs of transactions, strengthening of the linkage with 
the banking system, improvement in economic rationality and business 
orientation of the iqqub, and formalization and institutionalization of its 
procedures and operations. 
This study has cast doubt upon some sweeping generalizations often made 
about the iqqub. These are: 
• All members do not benefit equally; 
• It is meant only for a short period and therefore does not involve savings; 
• The pool is used for consumption purposes only; 
• It is based upon a spirit of gambling; 
• Members borrow from each other at zero interest rate; 
• There is no incentive to participate in more than one cycle of the same 
iqqub. 
The study has revealed that not all of these assertions are necessarily valid. 
III The iddir 
General considerations 
The iddir is an informal financial and social institution that is almost 
ubiquitous throughout Ethiopia. However, it is little investigated from the 
economic point of view. For example, there is no empirical evidence 
concerning the relationship between the iddir and the banking system. Other 
areas which need closer investigation are the distinction between different 
types of iddir, household characteristics of the participants of iddir, comparison 
of iddir in urban and rural areas, and recent emerging features of iddir. This 
section treats these and related points. 
The best definition of the iddir is that of Maun (1987, pp. 6-7), who 
defined it as: 
An association made up by a group of persons united by ties of family 
and friendship, by living in the same district, by jobs, or by belonging 
to the same ethnic group, and has an object of providing mutual aid 
and financial assistance in certain circumstances ... In practice, the iddir 
is a sort of insurance programme run by a community or a group to 
meet emergency situations. 
According to Sable (1986) the original purpose of the iddir was the burial of 
the dead. Today, the iddir provides a much wider range of services including 
financial and material assistance and consolations to a member in the event of 
difficulties as well as entertainment as the case may be. 
The expansion of the iddir in urban areas is perhaps assciciated with 
growing social insecurity. Sable (1986), for example, noted that: 'One of the 
most significant survival strategies or coping mechanisms adopted by Ethiopian 
urban populations is recourse to iddirs and iqqubs'. It has been observed that 
in Addis Ababa the iddir has been growing at a fast rate. Sable (1986) 
estimated that over a half of Addis Ababa households were thembers of iddips 
in 1986. Other estimated numbers of iddirs in Addis Ababa were 395 in 1969, 
600 in 1973 and 1,213 in 1983 (Mekuria Buicha, 19Th; Landuber Araya, 1983, 
p. 75). The case of one iddir is more illuminating; it was established by three 
elders in 1948 with contributions per member amounting to 10 cents per 
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month. Six months later, contributions were raised to 25 cents and payments 
to survivors of a deceased member were fixed at bin 50. By 1973 
contributions were raised to bin 1 and assistance to families of a deceased 
member to bin 150 (Aleme Feyissa, 1973). 
Originally, membership in iddirs was limited to the poor (Mekuria Bulcha, 
1973, p. 14). However, in recent years, people from the higher income group 
are also increasingly participating in this almost ubiquitous self-help 
organization. In particular, iddirs among friends and relatives have been 
expanding rapidly in recent years. 
The risks covered by iddirs include funeral expenses, financial assistance 
to families of the deceased and, in some cases, coverage of other risks such as 
medical expenses, losses due to fire or theft, etc. Almost every iddir has its 
own by-laws specifying the duties and rights of members, procedures and 
functions of officials. 
Social ties are very important in iddirs. A member is required to attend 
meetings, be present at funeral ceremonies, visit the sick, etc. The by-laws of 
iddirs are observed because of powerful social sanctions and fines. 
Members' contributions vary from one iddir to another. Most of the 
common fund is deposited in the bank'3; only a small sum of money is kept 
with the officials for emergency purposes. Most iddirs have their own tents, 
benches or chairs, utensils, etc. These materials are used mainly in the event 
of the death of a participant's family member. 
It is possible to distinguish between four types of iddir: 
1. Community or territorial, referring to people living in the same vicinity; 
2. Work-place or occupational, referring to people working in the same 
institution; 
3. Friends' iddir, referring to former schoolmates or people having close 
friendship; 
Family iddir, involving blood relatives or very close friends.'5 
The functions of iddirs are not limited to the provision of insurance and 
psychological support to its members; iddirs are often involved in community 
development programmes such as construction of roads or schools, and 
installation of public utilities etc. (e.g. see Mekuria Buicha, 1973; Aleme 
Feyissa, 1973).16 The iddir is considered an excellent vehicle for the state to 
gain direct access to the urban population (Sable, 1986). However, attempts 
at effective mobilization of resources through iddir for community 
development have not yet succeeded (Hamer, 1976; Cohen and Koehn, 1980, 
pp. 166-67), although such attempts were initiated as early as 1972 when the 
first seminar was convened for this purpose by the then Ministry of 
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Community Development and Social Affairs (Mekuria Bulcha, 1973). Similar 
attempts by the Insurance Corporation to integrate both iddir and iqqub with 
the formal sector have not yet succeeded. It has been observed that 'despite the 
abundance and vitality of these institutions the development agencies appear 
to have overlooked them as partners or tools in their work' (Sable, 1986). 
Iddirs can establish bank accounts in their names only upon presentation of 
a document certifying that they are registered with the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs. Since only a few of them (community iddirs, in particular) do register 
with the said Ministry, perhaps due to bureaucratic tangles involved, the bulk 
of them set up bank accounts in the hames of their officials. 
Iddirs are provided with little legal protection. Problems of embezzlement 
and corruption are often reported, as well-depicted in Mamo Wudineh's (1989) 
novel. Each iddir has its own by-laws and book-keeping system, and no 
attempt has so far been made to systematize them. 
The iddir in urban areas: cases from Addis Ababa 
A survey of a sample of 32 iddirs in Addis Ababa was undertaken in order to 
examine the structure of the iddir and its linkages with the banking system 
(see Table 6). Various types of iddir are identified and characterized. 
It has been observed that community (territorial) iddirs are the oldest type. 
The average age of the sample community iddirs was 26 years. Of the sample 
community iddirs, the oldest one was established in 1941, immediately 
following the end of the Italian occupation of Ethiopia. This iddir initiated 
operations with 40 to 50 members each contributing 10 cents every month. 
Presently, this iddir consists of 305 members contributing bin 3 each per 
month. Next to the community iddir, work-place (occupational) iddirs are the 
oldest ones. The average of the sample is 15 years. In contrast, friends' 
and family iddirs, which are growing at a fast rate17, are of recent origin. From 
the sample, the former averaged 10 years and the later six years. 
The average number of members for the sample iddirs is 246. Work-place 
iddirs, followed by community iddirs, are the largest in terms of membership. 
Work-place iddirs, with bank deposits averaging bin 33,551, are also the 
largest in terms of total financial assets. Friends' iddirs and family iddirs are 
of small size. However, they have the highest contributions per member, and 
they also have the largest bank deposit per member. Financial assistance to 
family members of the deceased member, averaging bin 890, is highest in 
work-place iddirs. Registration fees for all types of iddir average bin 73 per 
new member. Bank deposits, which average bin 108 per member, are highest 
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average 85%. The ratio for the community and work-place iddirs is more than 
90%. Cash at hand, averaging bin 759 per iddir, is maintained only for 
emergency purposes. There is no doubt that iddirs keep a large portion of their 
funds in the banks. 
All types of iddir, except family iddirs, participate in development schemes 
to varying degrees. The big iddirs, in particular, are involved in community 
development programmes such as construction of roads and installation of 
public utilities. The big iddirs (community and work-place iddirs) have their 
own tents, chairs, benches and utensils. 
A survey of employees of Addis Ababa University closely examined one 
work-place iddir (see Table 7). As high as 90% of the sample employees (n 
= 162) have not bought insurance policies. The proportion of sample 
employees having bought insurance policies, which averaged 10%, 
systematically increased from 3.7 in the low income group to 16.7% in the 
high income group. An insurance policy is invariably limited to those 
employees who built their own houses with money borrowed from the 
and Saving Bank because it is this bank's policy that a borrower should buy 
a life insurance policy as a pre-condition for receiving the requested loans. 
The responses to the question, 'why do you join iddir?' are almost the same 
across the sample. Iddirs entitle a person in difficulties to financial and 
material assistance and bring consolation from members. Compared to the 
insurance system, the iddir is considered a non-profit-making institution 
catering for the specific needs of a person. The respondents also mentioned the 
social and cultural aspects of the iddir. It provides a wider range of services 
than the insurance system. It is also culturally appropriate. 
The survey results suggest that, for many of the sample employees, the iddir 
is of recent origin. Many of them joined iddirs for the first time some 11 years 
ago. This can partially be attributable to the young age of most of the sampled 
employees. It has been observed that those in the higher income group joined 
iddirs later than those in the lower income group. 
The results revealed that a person is a member of more than one iddir. The 
average number of iddir per person is 2.2 and the average per household is as 
high as four iddirs. Women have their own separate iddirs in addition to those 
they have in common with other family members. Contributions to iddirs per 
person and per household average bin 7.7. and bin 13.8 respectively, per 
month. It has also been observed that contributions to iddirs increase with 
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It has been observed that the most common type of iddir for all income 
groups is the work-place iddir followed by the community iddir. The Addis 
Ababa University Employees Iddir (AAUI), with total capital amounting to birr 
353,000 and 1,900 members, is perhaps the largest work-place iddir in the 
country. Established in 1961, it is also one of the oldest. Of its total capital, 
bin 250,000 is in the form of equipment and durabies (AAU, 1990). It has a 
busy lounge providing services to the university community. 
There are 24 persons working in the lounge. Their total monthly salaries 
amount to bin 2,400. Income from the lounge is considerable. For example, 
during the month of May 1990, its gross income from the lounge amounted to 
bin 23,649.18 This iddir has two vehicles (one of which is a hearse), two tents, 
a number of utensils, chairs, bar equipment, etc. Usual monthly contributions 
are bin 3 per member. The registration fee for a new member is bin 150. 
The Ethiopian Teachers' Association iddir (ETAI) is a special type of iddir. 
Membership is restricted to members of the Ethiopian Teachers' Association. 
It is perhaps the only iddir organized at a national level. The ETAI, with 
capital amounting to bin 3.6 million and 45,078 members (50% of the total 
number of teachers in the country), is the largest iddir in the country. It grew 
to such a giant size within just six years. Monthly contributions are bin 5 per 
member. Almost all of its capital is deposited in banks. Cash in hand is very 
small. For example, petty cash kept at the national office is a mere bin 500. 
If it is able to enlist the remaining 50% of the teachers, it could be 
transformed into a medium-size insurance enterprise. ETAI has encountered 
some problems. One is the inability of branch offices to be able to transfer 
legally required funds promptly to the national office; another is the shortage 
of personnel to do book-keeping, properly administer funds and make timely 
reports. More serious are members' repeated requests for benefits not provided 
by the by-laws; these include advance payments for medical examination and 
transport, benefits to family members and requests for per diems in cases 
where a beneficiary travels to a place in accordance with a physician's 
recommendations. The ETAI, unlike other iddirs, does not provide assistance 
to the family of a member. 
The case of a viflage iddir 
Iddirs are not limited to urban areas only. They are also found in rural areas. 
A village iddir was established in Sina-Debre-Sina Village in 1957. During its 
initial period, contributions per member amounted to 10 cents per month. 
Today, there are 125 members (households) contributing 25 cents each per 
month. Since there are no banks even in the nearest towns, this iddir keeps its 
INFORMAL AND SEMI-FORMAL FINANCIAL SECTORS IN ETHIOPIA 35 
collections with the treasurer. Assistance given to the family members of a 
deceased member amounts to birr 30. The written by-law of this iddir is 
simple and short; it has three articles only.'9 
Summary and conclusion 
The study suggests that the iddir, unlike the insurance system, is very popular 
among the people. It is attractive because it is culturally appropriate, flexible, 
easily accessible and cost-effective. Unlike the insurance system, it is a 
non-profit-making institution based upon solidarity, friendship and mutual 
assistance among members. People from all types of socio-economic 
backgrounds participate in the iddir. The insurance system, on the other hand, 
is limited to high-income households seeking insurance policies for a definite 
purpose such as ensuring private houses or cars. 
The iddir has virtually no linkage with the insurance system. The Insurance 
Corporation has failed to attract iddirs into its recent scheme which proposed 
a type of insurance policy to cover members of iddirs. Only about 70 iddirs 
have thus far bought insurance policies. On the other hand, iddirs invariably 
have a strong linkage with the banking system. Iddirs keep the bulk of their 
financial assets in the banks. Only petty cash is kept at hand to meet 
emergency requirements. The sample iddirs, on average, deposited 85% of 
their financial assets in a bank. Bank deposits per member amounted to bin 
108. This sum is somewhat greater than the per capita bank deposit which 
amounted to bin 90 for the whole population. 
The study also suggests that in recent years more and more people are 
participating in iddir. New types of iddir are increasingly becoming popular 
among urban dwellers. Bank deposits per member are higher in the 
newly-emerging types of iddir. Iddirs in the rural areas seem to be of the 
community type and cater for the needs of households living in a village. 
IV Savings and credit co-operatives (SACC5) 
Introduction 
Savings and credit co-operatives (SACCs) can be designated as semi-fonnal 
financial institutions. They are outside the control of the central authorities 
with respect to ownership of assets and management. As a semi-formal 
financial sector, the SACC can establish a link between the informal (the iqqub 
and iddir) and formal sector. That is why this study has attempted to undertake 
a simultaneous study of the SACC and the 'traditional' informal sectors (i.e. 
the iqqub and iddir). It has attempted to lay the background for establishing 
the link between the iqqub, iddir and SACC. 
The SACCs in Ethiopia have recent origins. The oldest ones were 
established in the late 1960s, and they grew very slowly until 1978. One 
reason behind such slow growth was the political and social instability which 
followed the 1974 uprising. SACCs have been growing fast since 1978. 
However, the rate of growth is not the same for all co-operatives. Some of 
them are growing at very fast rates. 
The SACCs, as potential sources of savings in the country, need serious 
study. The existing literature is limited to two senior essays at Addis Ababa 
University which deal mainly with their origins and problems. Otherwise, it 
can be said that SACCs in Ethiopia are yet untouched by researchers. 
Savings and credit co-operatives are also known as credit unions, thrift and 
credit co-operatives or savings and credit associations. They are defined as 
follows: 
A thrift and credit co-operative is a free association of people with a 
common bond who save and lend money to one another at low interest 
rate for productive and provident purposes. (African Confeçleration of 
Co-operative and Credit Associations (ACCOSCA), 1969, p. 
3). 
A credit union is a co-operative financial organization owned and 
operated on a not-for-profit basis by its members according to 
democratic principles. Its purpose is to encourage savings, to use 
pooled funds, to make loans, and to provide other related services to 
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members and families. A credit union is part of a co-operative financial 
system and adheres to the operating principles for credit unions as set 
forth by the World Council of Credit Unions. (ACCOSCA, 1990). 
From these definitions it can be inferred that an SACC, generally speaking, has 
three basic purposes: to promote thrift, to provide a source of credit at a low 
interest rate, and to teach people the wise use of their money and the efficient 
management of their limited pooled resources (see also Kibirige, 1980, p. 7). 
An SACC has several unique characteristics which promote the self-help, 
member-owned and directed principles of co-operativism, service to members, 
social goals and leadership potential of its members. Some of these unique 
characteristics are discussed by ACCOSCA (1969), Kibirige (1980, p. 15) and 
ACCOSCA (1990). One characteristic is a common bond. Individuals who 
have something in common, whether based upon working together, belonging 
to the same organization or living together in the same geographical areas, 
know one another. Thus, they have already established a common bond that 
can be built upon to address economic and social needs. The common bond is 
necessary to develop mutual confidence among the members to help one 
another and to trust the decisions made on their behalf by their elected leaders. 
The different types of common bond are: 
• Work-place/employee common bond which is based upon individuals who 
have the same employer; 
• Association common bond which is characterized by individuals who 
belong to a religious, social or educational group; 
• Residential common bond which is based upon a geographical or political 
sub-division such as a sub-location, district, town or one or more villages. 
The basic goal of a savings and credit association is to encourage thrift among 
its members not to make profit, and not to supply charity, but to provide 
services. Members are paid dividends on shares and interest on 
savings/deposits. SACCs grant loans to members who might not qualify for 
credit elsewhere and who cannot afford the high loan rates offered in either the 
informal sector or by other types of financial institutions. However: 
The loan committee will refuse a loan applicant if the purpose for the 
borrowing is not for any worthwhile purpose or it does not improve the 
member's economic status. The committee has to be careful not to 
grant loans to members who cannot afford to repay them (ACCOSCA, 
1990). 
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It is said that lending is based upon the 'three Cs' of credit: character, capacity 
and collateral. 
Other characteristics of SACCs are provision of financial services (e.g. 
financial counselling to members), the principle of 'pay him first' (i.e. 
realizing that saving for tomorrow is better than borrowing for tomorrow), and 
developing members' leadership potential, initiative and capabilities to improve 
their outlook on life. In addition, it should be noted that SACCs are based on 
the principles of voluntary entry and withdrawal; democratic control; political, 
racial and religious neutrality. 
SACCs are different from banks in that they are owned by all members who 
have a voice in their operations, whereas banks are owned by shareholders and 
are generally interested in big loans to rich people. Banks always ask for 
security, while credit unions consider good character and ability to pay in 
granting loans. 
SACCs are promoted not only for money; they contribute to the promotion 
of total human development. SACCs develop people's minds by providing 
motivation, creating initiative, promoting self-development and self-reliance 
and providing leadership. They also develop material well-being by raising the 
living standards of members, making possible regular savings and wise use of 
money, providing loans at low interest rate and by making possible economic 
emancipation of members (Kibirige, 1980, pp. 18-24). 
SACCs originated in Germany in the mid-nineteenth century.2° Today there 
are about 78 million SACCs in 80 countries organized under the umbrella of 
the World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU) which was established in 1958. 
ACCOSCA was established in 1968 at a conference held in Nairobi. The status 
of WOCCU as of 1989 is indicated in Table 8. Of the various affiliates of 
WOCCU, the Credit Union National Association of America (CUNA) alone 
accounts for 69% of the total membership and 72% of the total assets of 
WOCCU. Contributions and savings per member varied from US$139 in Latin 
America to over US$5,000 in the Caribbean and other regions. 
The first savings and credit co-operative2' in Ethiopia was established in 
1964 by employees of Ethiopian Airlines. During the same period, credit 
co-operatives were established by employees of the Ethiopian Road Authority 
and the Telecommunication Agency. It is interesting to note that these 
organizations are among the most modem and relatively efficient enterprises 
in the country. The Co-operative Societies Proclamation Act No. 241/66 was 
passed in 1966. Existing co-operative societies were registered under this 
proclamation with the Ministry of Community Development and Social Affairs. 
A national promotion committee, known as the Ethiopian Thrift and Credit 
Co-operative Development, was set up in 1970 in order to promote savings and 
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African Conference on the Mobilization of Local Savings, facilitated Ethiopia's 
affiliation with ACCOSCA. It contributed to the increase in the number of 
SACCs in Ethiopia, and it was able to secure assistance from a number of 
international donor agencies towards the development of SACCs. However, the 
national promotion committee was not then granted legal status. That was one 
reason why it was succeeded by the Ethiopian National Thrift and Credit 
Co-operative Society in 1973. This society was established by the already 
existing credit unions under the 1966 Co-operative Societies Proclamation Act 
No. 241. It was administered by a board of directors elected by the general 
assembly of the representatives of each affiliated society. This national society 
was able to contribute to the further development of savings and credit unions 
in Ethiopia until its liquidation with the passage of the 1976 Monetary and 
Banking Proclamation No. 99 and the 1978 Co-operative Societies 
Proclamation No. 138. The development of SACCs in Ethiopia up to 1978 is 
indicated in Table 9. By 1978, there were 60 SACCs in the country comprising 
13,020 members with savings amounting to bin 4 million. The annual rate of 
growth of membership over the 1974-78 period averaged 12% and the average 
savings per member over the same period was bin 268. The average annual 
rate of growth in the number of SACCs was slightly higher: 14.7%. 
The legal framework of existing SACCs in Ethiopia was provided by the 
1978 Co-operative Societies Proclamation No. 138. The socialist orientation 
and character of this Proclamation are evident from the preamble and from its 
provisions. It was unequivocally provided that different types of co-operatives 
shall be organized for, inter alia, the objectives of (1) putting the means of 
production under the control of co-operatives and for transforming them 
gradually to collective property as may be necessary, and (2) conducting 
political agitation, and participating in the building up of a socialist economy 
(Article 3). The Proclamation provided for the establishment of Thrift and 
Credit Co-operative Societies along with three other co-operatives, namely, the 
Producers' Co-operative Societies, Service Co-operative and Housing 
Co-operative Societies22. It is evident from the proclamation that SACCs are 
associated with the development of socialism, a system about which the public 
is far from enthusiastic. However, the law has stopped short of providing the 
eventual transformation of individual savings into collective property. 
Proclamation No. 138 of 1978 rather provided that: 
Thrift and Credit Co-operatives may be formed by individuals working 
in one undertaking or office for making regular savings and to obtain 
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Here it is important to note the urban bias of the proclamation: peasant 
farmers, who constitute more than 80% of the labour force, do not work 'in 
one undertaking or office'. 
The attempt to bring SACCs under the control of central authorities is 
evident from the Proclamation. Societies formed under Proclamation No. 
241/1966 may be dissolved by the decision of a board set up to oversee 
co-operative societies where their objectives and membership are inconsistent 
with Proclamation No. 138/1978. Such co-operatives shall be liquidated where 
necessary. All SACCs are required to register with the National Bank of 
Ethiopia (Article 12.ld). 
SACCs in Ethiopia since 1978: general considerations 
Today SACCs are organized and supervised by the Savings and Credit 
Co-operative Development Office (SACCDO) of the National Bank of Ethiopia 
in accordance with the provisions of Proclamation No. 138 of 1978. SACCDO, 
among other things, sees to it that SACCs implement the following rules and 
procedures: 
• Registering SACCs, issuing certificates of establishment and dissolving 
them when necessary; 
• Formulating by-laws for the administration of SACCs; 
• Auditing the accounts of SACCs; 
• Paying members an interest rate of 6% per annum on their deposit with 
SACC; 
• Making sure that credit released to members is in line with the National 
Bank's policy of controlling inflation; 
• Keeping 25% of the gross profit of an SACC in the bank in the form of 
reserves in line with the practice prior to the 1978 proclamation; 
• Making accounts available for auditing by the National Bank. 
Otherwise, individual SACCs own and run their own co-operative societies as 
they see fit. The development of SACCs in Ethiopia since 1978 is shown in 
Table 10 and the Appendix. The number of SACCs in Ethiopia, which grew 
at an average of 23.5% per annum, increased from 60 in 1978 to 484 in 1990. 
Similarly, membership, growing at an average rate 26.7% per annum, 
increased from 13,020 persons in 1978 to 118,037 in 1990. Savings also 
increased from bin 4 million in 1978 to bin 69 million in 1990. Savings per 
member averaged bin 349 over the same period. The total assets and reserves 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































44 RESEARCH PAPER 21 
is clear that SACCs expanded at faster rates during the 1978-90 period than 
the previous'period. However, so far, only 27% of the labour unions have 
established SACCs (Hagos Hailu, 1990, P. 22). 
SACCs are unevenly distributed over different regions of the country. As 
high as 60% of the total number of SACCs and 79% of the total co-operative 
savings are found in Addis Ababa. Many of the administrative regions have 
very few SACCs or none at all. Security problems, in addition to existing 
structural and other types of problems (see below), have hindered the 
expansion of SACCs throughout the country. Moreover, existing SACCs are 
established in urban areas, and there are none in the rural areas. 
Government employees constitute the overwhelming majority of the 
membership. Presently, NGOs such as the Christian Children's Fund are 
increasingly facilitating the establishment of SACCs among recipients of 
foreign aid. SACCDO is encouraging the establishment of SACCs among 
small traders and workers in the informal sector. In fact, one of the most 
successful SACCs, the Assella Truck Loaders and Unloaders Savings and 
Credit Co-operative, was established within the informal sector (see below). 
SACCs are also being established by neighbouring urban-dwellers who have 
no financial common bond. 
The development of SACCs in Ethiopia, as of 1989, compared to 25 other 
African countries, is indicated in Tables 1 là and 1 lb. The number of SACCs 
in Africa totals 5,152, ranged from 1 in the Seychelles to 1,760 in Kenya23. 
Ethiopia is fourth after Uganda and the Cameroon. But, savings (deposit) per 
member, averaging US$230, ranged from a mere 50 cents in Uganda to 521 
in Liberia. Membership as a percentage of the total population ranged from 
0.004 in Nigeria to 6.2 in the Seychelles. Other countries with relatively high 
numbers of people joining SACCs are Rwanda (4%), Kenya (3.5%) and 
Mauritius (2.6%). The ratio for Ethiopia is 0.2%. Deposit per member as a 
ratio of GNP per capita ranged from 0.002 in Uganda to 2 in Ethiopia. Only 
two other countries in Africa, Kenya (1.3) and Liberia (1.2) have a savings 
ratio greater than 1. It can be inferred that the development of SACCs in 
Africa is uneven; a great deal of effort is required to raise SACCs from the 
existing low level of development, and the saving effort (as measured by the 
ratio of savings per member to GNP per capita) in Ethiopia is quite significant 
given the prevailing economic crisis and social problems. 
The cost of organizing and overseeing credit unions in Ethiopia seems 
modest. The total expenses of SACCDO in 1989 were bin 173,464. Expenses 
per member and per union in 1989 stood at bin 1.5 and bin 358 respectively 
(Yassin Shifa, 1990, p. 45). 
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Table ha Development of SACCs in Ethiopia and other African countries, 1989 
No. of Population GNP 
credit Deposits 1988 per capita 
Country unions Members (US$) (millions) (US$) 1988 
Ethiopia 433 101,600 24,636,847 47.88 120 
Benin 6 2,817 108,003 4.45 340 
Botswana 24 4,760 765,826 1.21 1,548 
Burkina Faso 50 6,606 1,148,708 8.8 230 
Cameroon 240 72,358 36,570,503 10.67 1,010 
Côte d'lvoire 78 12,372 1,809,797 11.61 740 
Gambia 83 3,795 47,553 0.81 220 
Ghana 249 87,407 2,432,852 14.13 400 
Kenya 1,760 826,000 394,277,514 23.88 360 
Lesotho 73 30,000 971,445 1.68 410 
Liberia 71 20,001 10,421,409 2.52 450 
Malawi 95 15,835 920,061 7.75 160 
Mauntius 71 26,200 3,026,601 1.00 1,810 
Nigeria 45 4,285 931,540 104.96 290 
Awanda 109 269,421 44,598,927 6.75 310 
Senegal 22 2,600 113,000 7.11 660 
Seychelles 1 4,306 1,965,773 0.07 3,800 
Sierra Leone 79 4,219 45,402 3.95 240 
Swaziland 30 3,500 291,826 0.74 790 
Tanzania 381 112,115 1,897,037 24.00 160 
Togo 109 17,673 3,616,565 3.25 370 
Uganda 751 322,000 152,928 17.17 280 
Zaire 145 274,389 4,678,376 33.46 170 
Zambia 169 109,930 2,892,348 7.53 290 
Zimbabwe 78 9,223 1,412,563 8.88 660 
Source: WOCCU, 1989. 
The major problems retarding the growth of SACCs in Ethiopia can be 
classified into policy, structural, social and technical constraints. Some of the 
problems are that opportunities for productive investment are limited due to 
policy constraints and bureaucratic tangles. Some government ministries (e.g., 
the Ministry of Education) give only limited assistance to credit unions 
although the proclamation of 1978 (No. 138 article 20) provides that 
co-operatives be given government assistance. The abolition of the independent 
national union of SACCs in 1978 was followed by a termination of aid from 
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Table 11 b Development of SACCs in Ethiopia and other African countries, 1989 
Deposits per Memberships 
Deposit per member 
as a ratio of 
Country member (US$) as % of pop. GNP per capita 
Ethiopia 242.5 0.2 2.0 
Benin 38.3 0.06 0.1 
Botswana 160.9 0.4 0.1 
Burkina Faso 173.9 0.08 0.8 
Cameroon 505.4 0.7 0.5 
Coted'lvoire 146.3 0.1 0.2 
Gambia 12.5 0.5 0.06 
Ghana 27.8 0.6 0.07 
Kenya 477.2 3.5 1.3 
Lesotho 32.4 1.8 0.08 
Liberia 521.0 0.8 1.2 
Malawi 58.1 0.2 0.4 
Mauritius 115.5 2.6 0.06 
Nigeria 217.4 0.004 0.8 
Rwanda 165.5 4 0.5 
Senegal 43.5 0.04 0.07 
Seychelles 456.5 6.2 0.1 
Sierra Leone 10.8 0.1 0.05 
Swaziland 83.4 0.5 0.1 
Tanzania 16.9 0.4 0.1 
Togo 204.6 0.5 0.6 
Uganda 0.5 1.9 0.002 
Zaire 17.1 0.8 0.1 
Zambia 26.3 1.5 0.09 
Zimbabwe 153.2 0.1 0.2 
Source: WOCCU, 1989. 
some international donor agencies. This national association had its own 
central fund which was set up by over 20 individual SACCs contributing dues 
collected from their respective individual members. This central fund 
constituted a link between the individual member of an SACC and 
international credit unions. This fund could be used for the purpose of training 
SACC leaders and exchange of experience among national associations. 
Moreover, this central fund could evolve into a type of banking system if an 
enabling environment were created. The establishment of a credit union bank 
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was a basic goal of SACCDO. In other countries a central fund plays a critical 
role in the development of credit unions. Interestingly, the central fund of 
those SACCs mentioned above is still not liquidated. It is possible that people 
in Ethiopia are suspicious of any organization associated, though remotely, 
with the idea of furthering the goals of socialism. There is a lack of confidence 
in government policies. Structural problems exist in the form of limited saving 
potential, inadequacy of infrastructure and limited expansion of markets. Social 
problems also pose obstacles in the way of expansion of credit unions. For 
example, there are plausible suspicions that money lenders' attempt to resist 
the formation of credit unions for fear of losing clients. SACCDO could not 
facilitate the expansion of SACCs according to plan due to technical problems 
such as shortage of skilled manpower. Some SACCs are not operating because 
of such factors as the merging of different organizations or business 
contraction in the private sector arising from shortage of raw materials. 
One conspicuous point in the development of SACCs in Ethiopia is the 
absence of credit unions in the rural areas where more than 80% of the 
population live. 
Case studies 
A close look at the operations of individual SACCs can be provided by taking 
selected case studies of outstanding co-operatives. SACCDO identifies a model 
SACC according to the following criteria: 
• Has its own office and independently and properly manages its account; 
• Has reputed leadership which attends to the interests of its members and 
implements the principles of the savings and credit co-operative; 
• Has close and healthy relations with SACCDO; 
• Exhibits sustainable growth over a given period of time. 
Of the model SACCs, case studies are provided of the following organizations: 
Ethiopian Airlines, Telecommunication Authority, Assella Truck Loaders and 
Unloaders Labour Union, and Addis Ababa University. 
Case One. The first savings and credit co-operative in Ethiopia was The 
Ethiopian Airlines Employees' Savings and Credit Co-operative. It was 
established in January 1964 with an interest-free loan Of US$26,000 from the 
employer. By late 1974, savings capital amounted to US$520,000, the 
equivalent of 74% of the saving capital of all Ethiopian credit unions at that 
time (Kirsch and Goricke, 1977, p. 114). Today, this credit co-operative claims 
48 RESEARCH PAPER 21 
one of the largest capital bases: bin 10 million. However, its share in the total 
capital of all credit unions has sharply fallen from 74% in 1974 to 11% in 
1990, while its share in the total number of members in the country is a mere 
2.3%. This union extends loans amounting to a maximum of bin 15,000 (the 
biggest in Ethiopia) to its members totalling 2,700 persons. Its capital per 
member, amounting to bin 3,704, is ten times the average for the country. 
The union renders its members various services other than savings and 
credit. It has its own fuel station. Presently, it is planning to invest in other 
income-generating activities such as the sales of tyres, running of a cafeteria, 
distribution of petrol, and sales of basic textile goods and footwear to its 
members. 
Case Two. The Telecommunication Authority Employees' Savings and Credit 
Co-operative25 is among the largest and most successful unions in Ethiopia. It 
was established in 1969 with an initial capital of bin 100,000, half of which 
was subsidized by the Telecommunication Authority. Initially, members saved 
the fixed sum of bin 100 per month irrespective of the size of their salaries. 
The maximum loan granted to members was bin 500 repayable in one year. 
Today, a uniform rate of savings, 8% per month, is obligatory for members. 
Membership has grown to 5,000 persons (90% of the total employees of the 
Telecommunication Authority). The total capital of this credit union is more 
than bin 12 million (more than 13% of the capital of all SACCs in Ethiopia). 
The maximum loan granted to a member is bin 12,000 repayable in seven 
years at an interest rate of 1% per mornh on the remaining balance. A 
borrower is entitled to additional loans once a portion of the previous loan has 
been repaid according to schedule. The purpose of lending does not matter as 
long as there is money to lend. In case there is a shortage of funds, priority is 
given to needy borrowers. There are times when the credit union borrowed 
money from the Authority to cover occasional shortfalls. For example, in 1988 
and 1989, the union borrowed bin 870,000 from the Authority in order to meet 
its members' growing demand for loans. 
In addition to the forced savings of 8%, members could voluntarily save 
any amount they would like under a special arrangement with the union. The 
union keeps voluntary savings in a current account so that savers can take back 
their savings any time they wish to do so. Moreover, the union pays voluntary 
savers an interest rate of 6% per annum. Today the special type of savings 
amount to bin 38,000. The union gives service to voluntary savers free of 
charge. This type of savings is attractive to savers, unlike that of banks, 
because of the ease with which they are able to examine their account and the 
physical accessibility of the union's office to members. Moreover, members 
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may feel a sense of self-reliance and solidarity by making use of their own 
democratically-instituted union. 
The union has also initiated an incipient form of insurance system on an 
experimental basis.26 Members jointly buy an insurance policy by contributing 
50 cents each every month to the common pool deposited with the union. This 
reserve fund is intended to defray possible defaults arising from a member's 
inability to repay loans due to death. The advantage of the reserve fund is to 
relieve legal beneficiaries and guarantors of the deceased member of the 
burden of paying debt. In this way it is expected that 'the debt dies with the 
debtor'. Moreover, it is intended that the scheme contribute to reductions in the 
cost of litigation arising from defaults. Presently, the amount of the reserve is 
very small (bin 2,489), and thus far, no payments have been made from this 
fund. 
The union grants loans to members to cover medical expenses incurred by 
their families. As to members themselves they are entitled to free medical 
service provided by the Authority. The union provides services to the 
employees' iddir and to the labour union. Both institutions have separate 
current accounts with the credit union. These accounts can be considered as 
joint accounts since they involve pooled funds. To date, the iddir and the 
labour union have, respectively, balances amounting to bin 30,000 and 200,000 
with the credit union. This money is deposited in a current account with the 
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia. 
The Telecommunication Authority provides various assistance to the union 
in the form of an office for eight employees and some office equipment. it 
pays the salary for one full-time union employee and provides a half-day 
off-duty for committee members to attend weekly meetings. It is also due to 
the strong support given by the Authority that the union gives efficient services 
to members working outside Addis Ababa. Presently, the union is considering 
possibilities for initiating investment in different income-generating ventures. 
A brief summary of the financial statement of the credit union in 1989 is 
as follows. The total income in 1989, amounting to bin 1,327, 903, is more 
than that of the previous year by 24.7%. The total expenses in 1989, 
amounting to bin 736,308, are greater than that of 1988 by 79.7%. The main 
reason for such a rise in expenditure in 1989 is the payment made to the 
special fund raised by the government in response to the call .of the motherland 
in accordance with Decree No. 2/1980 (E.C.) of the Council of Ministers.27 
The Decree rules that savings and credit co-operatives should contribute 25% 
of their incomes from interest. The amount paid was bin 235,494. The net 
profit in 1989, which is down by 9.8% as compared to 1988, is bin 591,595. 
The liabilities and capital in 1989 were bin 12,155,378. The union distributed 
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among its members accumulated profit (from 1983-87) amounting to bin 
1,252,637 in accordance with the decision of the general assembly of members. 
Case Three. The Assella Truck Loaders and Unloaders' Savings and Credit 
Co-operative (ATSACC)28 is unique in several respects. First, it was 
established by daily labourers operating in the informal sector. Second, it is 
perhaps the only model co-operative established outside Addis Ababa. 
ATSACC is located 176 km to the south of Addis Ababa in Assella, the 
regional capital of Arsi administrative region. Assella is the centre for one of 
the few prosperous agricultural regions in the country. The origins of this 
co-operative can be traced to 1974 when some 80 daily labourers formed a 
self-help association by contributing 15 cents each periodically and started 
depositing the joint fund in the bank. Unfortunately, the association had to be 
terminated and the joint fund distributed among members two and a half years 
later as a result of disagreements arising among members. However, in 1977 
a few of the former members of the disbanded association were organized into 
a labour union by local officials of the Ministry of Agriculture. Later, members 
of the union were able to form a savings and credit association following a 
seminar held in Assella regarding the advantages and organization of such an 
association. In 1979, ATSACC was granted legal status upon registration with 
the National Bank of Ethiopia. 
Today, ATSACC consists of 112 members (all males). The daily earnings 
obtained from loading and unloading agricultural products and manufactured 
goods are deposited in the bank. Members are paid a uniform salary of bin 
170 per month in two instalments. Physically weak members get the same 
salary as the stronger ones but are assigned to light tasks. Mechanisms are 
developed to avoid seasonal fluctuations in payment to members. 
The total savings and assets of ATSACC in 1990 amounted to bin 198,004 
and over 257,614, respectively. The co-operative has its own offices and a hall 
which cost more than bin 50,000. The co-operative also has a lounge and 
common bath rooms which are also used by the public upon payment of 
service charges. About 17 of the members have built their own private houses. 
The co-operative also has a type of insurance scheme which is akin to the 
iddir. A member who is ill and unable to work due to causes not related to 
work in the co-operative enterprise is entitled to six month's full salary. A 
member who is ill or disabled due to causes arising from working conditions 
in the co-operative enterprise is entitled to full salary until he recovers and 
starts work. Medical expenses incuned by a member are covered by the 
co-operative. In the event of the death of a member, all other members 
contribute bin 5 each as assistance to the family members of the deceased. 
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Self-imposed discipline is strictly observed by members. A person violating 
rules and regulations of the co-operative may be fined up to 50% of his 
monthly salary. It is interesting to note here that the labour union acts also as 
an employer of the members. Those members who are engaged in office work 
are exempted from manual work. The office of the co-operative enterprise 
plays an active role in the promotion of savings and credit co-operatives in the 
area by demonstrating the advantages of such an association. 
The co-operative has plans to initiate additional income-generating ventures. 
It has already installed its own bakery. A considerable number of members 
have their own side-line activities including small-scale dairy fanns. 
Case Four. Addis Ababa University Employees' Savings and Credit 
Co-operative (AAUSACC)29 is one of the fastest growing credit co-operatives 
in Ethiopia. Capital per member in 1990 was nine times that of 1983, while 
the national average for the same period was only doubled. It has been 
reported that a certain individual member was able to save as much as birr 
1 1,000 with AAUSACC. It was established in 1982 with an initial capital 
amounting to bin 10,700 and with membership totalling 470 persons. During 
its initial period, the Addis Ababa University granted it an interest-free loan 
amounting to bin 83,500. The university also stopped granting salary advances 
to its employees in order to encourage them to join the co-operative in the 
hope of getting a better source of credit. Membership in 1990, though limited 
to the Addis Ababa campuses, consisted of 1,765 persons (Table 12). Its 
capital in 1990 amounted to bin 1,973,509. Per member capital, amounting to 
bin 1118.1, is a little less than double the national average. The maximum 
loan has been raised from a mere bin 300 in 1982 to 7,000 at present.3° A 
member is entitled to a maximum of eight times his (her) deposit. Loans up 
to bin 5,000 are repayable in 36 months and those between bin 5,000 and 
7,000 in 48 months. Loans are granted to the extent possible only to the needy 
members in accordance with the by-laws of the co-operative. Initially, there 
was suspicion that some members repeatedly borrowed from the co-operative 
for unworthy purposes or for the purpose of lending to others at high interest 
rates. 
AAUSACC has not yet distributed among its members its accumulated 
profit, which amounts to bin 101,777.31 However, members are being paid 
interest on their savings. For example, in 1990 a sum of bin 87,907 was 
distributed among members in the form of interest payments. 
The cost of running the co-operative is modest. During the year 
ending June 1990, it amounted to bin 14,429 (of which salary amounted to 
bin 9,452). Operating costs per member amounted to bin 8 per annum or 16% 
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of the annual interest payment to members. It is only with three full-time 
office workers that the co-operative serves 1,765 persons. 
The impressive success of AAUSACC is partially attributable to the effort 
of the committee officials and the office workers, the efficient system of 
accounting, the relatively high per capita income of a considerable number of 
the employees, a high degree of appreciation of the advantages of savings and 
credit co-operatives by the employees, and a modest degree of assistance 
provided by the university administration. 
Table 12 Addis Ababa University Employees' Savings and 








1982 470 10,700 22.8 
1983 747 92,249 123.5 
1984 910 225,867 248.2 
1985 1124 513,550 456.9 
1986 1342 757,578 564.5 
1987 1453 1,026,042 706.1 
1988 1557 1,392,443 894.3 
1989 1634 1,593,883 975.4 
1990 1765 1,973,509 1118.1 
Source: Data obtained from AAUSACC and from survey of university 
employees. 
On the basis of the results of the survey of employees of Addis Ababa 
University, as high as 90.7% of the sample employees reported that they had 
belonged to AAUSACC (Table 13). The respondents gave different reasons for 
joining this credit union. The most common response was the need to save 
money and to borrow when the need arises. Some of the respondents indicated 
the relative advantages of credit unions over alternative means of savings and 
sources of credit. They emphasized the fact that the scheme of deducting 
deposits directly from the salaries of the employees made regular savings 
possible. There are those who said that they have now developed savings 
habits resulting from their involvement in the credit union; 41% of the sample 
reported that they had no habit of saving before they joined the union (Table 
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13). There are those who stressed the possibility of saving a large sum of 
money without feeling the burden of doing so. Some respondents mentioned 
the possibility of borrowing a large sum of money at a reasonable interest rate. 
Some of them have also appreciated the long maturity period of the loans 
received from AAUSACC. It is also interesting to note that a considerable 
number of respondents indicated that they use their savings when they retire.32 
It was for these reasons that 91% of the sample employees (Table 13) 
indicated that they had benefitted from joining the union. 
The survey results have also revealed that the savings rate, which averaged 
6%, is lowest (5.2%) in the low-income group. Monthly savings per 
participant, averaging birr 32.4, systematically increased from birr 9.4 in the 
low-income group to bin 50.8 in the high-income group. 
The sample employees gave different reasons for borrowing money from 
AAUSACC. Most of them indicated that they borrowed to purchase expensive 
consumer durables and to construct or renovate private houses. A few 
mentioned such reasons as the need for paying medical expenses for family 
members, sending children abroad for education and covering wedding 
expenses. One respondent said that he borrowed money in order to pay the 
registration fee (bin 150) charged by Addis Ababa University employees' 
iddir. 








Average salary per employee (birr) 180.2 564.2 795.5 513.3 
Income per household (birr) 219.0 737.0 1738.0 898 
Per cent of sample belonging to 
AAUSACC 88.9 87.0 96.3 90.7 
Savings as% of average 
salary per employee 5.2 6.5 6.4 6 
Savings per participant (birr) 9.4 36.9 50.8 32.4 
Per cent of sample not saving 
before joining AAUSACC 36.4 46.9 40.4 41.2 
Per cent of sample benefiting from 
AAUSACC 82.6 97.8 94.2 91.5 
Source: Data obtained from MUSACC and from survey of university employees. 
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According to information released by the Office of AAUSACC, credit uses are 
for, in order of importance, renovation or completion of private houses (3 8.6% 
of the total borrowers), purchase of household durables (2 1.9%), expenditure 
on personal problems (13.7%), medical expenses (7.4%), land tax or house rent 
(6.2%), and installation of piped water or electricity (4.3%). Here, it should be 
noted that 60% of the credit is directed towards investment projects in the 
form of house construction and purchases of household durables. 
Some respondents complained (though not included in the questionnaire) 
that the interest rate charged by the union (1% per month on the unpaid sum) 
is unbearable. 
Finally, consideration is given to the extent of participation in credit 
co-operatives, vis-a-vis iqqub and iddir, on the basis of summary information 
generated by the survey of employees of Addis Ababa University (see Table 
14 and Figure 2). According to this survey, of the three institutions considered 
in the study, the credit co-operative (i.e. AAUSACC) is the most popular one 
among employees of Addis Ababa University. As high as 91% of the sample 
employees from all income groups are members of the AAUSACC. The ratios 
for the iddir and iqqub are 83 and 48%, respectively. The iqqub is perhaps 
gradually giving way to the credit co-operative. The credit co-operative is 
preferred to the iqqub because the waiting time in general is short (there is no 
need for drawing lots or 'buying' a lot). The credit co-operative makes it 
possible to save on a regular basis for a much longer period of time. The size 
of loans that can be obtained from the credit co-operative is, in general, greater 
than collections from iqqub organized by salary-earners, and credit 
co-operatives make possible savings for general and precautionary purposes, 
unlike iqqub which is often established for a specific purpose. The extent of 
participation in the credit union is positively associated with age, level of 
education and per capita income. 
On the other hand, it is unlikely that credit co-operatives substitute for the 
iddir. Some of the benefits which are provided to members by the iddir and 
not by credit co-operatives are culturally appropriate social interactions and 
solidarity among the participants; equality among members irrespective of 
differences in economic and social status; provision of materials such as tents, 
chairs and utensils when a participant mourns for a deceased family member. 
The place of SACCs vis-à-vis the formal and informal sectors is depicted 
in Figure 2 in which linkages between the financial institutions are partially 
shown by way of a summary. Rural households have no access to the formal 
and informal financial sectors. On the other hand, they do make use of the 
iqqub and iddir. Urban households have access in varying degrees to the 
formal, semi-formal and informal sectors. SACCs are linked to both the 
banking system and the iddir. The link between SACCs and the insurance 
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system is at an embryonic stage in its development. Banks are linked to 
SACCs as well as to the iqqub and iddir. 
Summary and conclusion 
Savings and credit co-operatives have huge potential for savings mobilization 
in Ethiopia. Although the rate of growth of these co-operatives has been 
relatively high since 1978, much remains to be done to realize their existing 
potential. The case of the model co-operatives has brought to light certain 
important points. The ingenuity and creativity of those successful co-operatives 
are admirable; they are actively investing in income-generating activities. The 
weaker co-operatives have much to learn from the successful ones. The case 
of the daily labourers' co-operative has demonstrated that credit unions can 
thrive even among the uneducated and poor workers operating in the informal 
sector. 








Average age 34.0 36.7 38.4 36.4 
Proportion of males (%) 537 59.3 64.8 59.3 
Proportion of married persons (%) 61.1 59.2 79.6 66.6 
Average household size 5.7 5.6 5.4 5.6 
Degree-holders as % of samples 3.7 34.6 80.0 39.4 
Income per household (birr) 219.2 737.9 1,737.6 898.2 
Per capita income (birr) 55.1 199.4 218.0 
Proportion belonging to 
AAUSACC (%) 88.9 87.3 96.3 90.8 
Proportion belonging to iddir (%) 83.3 83.3 81.5 82.7 
Proportion belonging to iqqub (%) 41.0 48.0 56.0 48.3 
Source: Data obtained from AAUSACC and from survey of University employees. 
Credit co-operatives have varying degrees of linkage with the informal and 
formal sectors. The linkage with the iddir, in particular, is interesting. There 
are cases where the iddir has become an integral part of a credit union. The 
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Assella Truck Loaders and Unloaders' Co-operative is a case in point. The 
origin of this co-operative was traced to an iddir. In the case of the 
Telecommunication Authority iddir members deposit their funds with the credit 
union. The latter, in turn, deposit the money in the bank. In this way, the 
semi-formal sector creates linkages between the informal and formal sector. 
The unions are also developing their own insurance system while the 
formal sector is attempting to sell insurance policies to the unions. 
FIgure 2 The informal sector and financial flows in Ethiopia 
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The linkages between credit co-operatives and labour unions are also 
interesting. The Assella Truck Loaders and Unloaders Labour Union has 
become an integral part of the credit union. The labour union of the 
Telecommunication Authority deposits its funds with the credit co-operatives. 
Inter-institutional co-operation can promote the growth of credit co-operatives. 
The study has revealed the possibility that people in the informal sector can 
mobilize savings and establish small-scale enterprises by organizing themselves 
into credit co-operatives. Credit co-operatives have affected the savings 
behaviour of participants. The survey of the employees of Addis Ababa 
University has revealed that credit co-operatives might have 
savings-habit-creation effects and sources of savings-displacement effects. 
It is possible to remove or mitigate most of the constraints hampering the 
expansion of credit co-operatives in the country. An independent national 
credit co-operative should be established on the basis of democratic 
participation of member co-operatives. Credit co-operatives should disassociate 
themselves from the idea of socialism and furthering of political goals. Ways 
and means should be found to extend credit co-operatives into the rural areas. 
Credit co-operatives need vigorous government assistance. 
Members themselves should assert their democratic rights in running their 
own co-operatives. It is not clear, for example, why the academic staff of 
Addis Ababa University are under-represented in the committees of the 
co-operative. 
The leadership of the co-operatives should strictly observe the basic 
principles and goals of credit co-operatives. Loans should be granted only for 
worthwhile purposes. Dividends should be distributed to members on time. It 
is not clear why the distribution of the dividends is delayed in some 
co-operatives. 
Officials of savings and credit co-operatives claim that they charge an 
interest rate of 1% per month on the unpaid balance of loans granted to 
members. They assert that this amounts to an average of 6.5% per year. This 
assertion has been challenged by Hailu Legesse (1990) who attempted to 
demonstrate that the implicit interest rate is rather between 11 and 12% per 
year. Members feel that the interest rate charged by savings and credit 
co-operatives is high. For example, some sample employees of Addis Ababa 
University said that the interest rate is quite 'unbearable'. 
As the credit co-operative is a newly-emerging financial institution in 
Ethiopia, some of the issues which need clarification are existing loan interest 
rates, whether loan applications should be considered only for worthwhile 
purposes and whether unions should move into profit-making activities. In 
general, it is interesting to investigate the extent to which the principles of 
credit co-operatives are applied to Ethiopian conditions. 
V General conclusions 
The following conclusions, as well as the foregoing ones, are subject to 
limitations in the sample size of this study. The tentative conclusions made 
here need to be confirmed by further studies. 
The iqqub and iddir expanded in urban areas 'as a vast unconscious process 
of arousing and co-ordinating energies to meet the novel realities of Ethiopia's 
current historical situation' (Levine, 1972, p. 281). The niodern self-help 
associations in urban areas must not be seen as results of socio-cultural 
constraints in the traditional sector but as the basis for incipient intermediate 
financial technology developed over time in response to the growing demand 
for financial and social security by people already uprooted from the 
village-level communal life but still living within a 'penny economy'. In a 
society where monetary relations have not yet sufficiently developed, culturally 
appropriate financial institutions will remain indispensable. People who might 
not qualify for bank loans or insurance policies resort to the iqqub and iddir. 
Interestingly enough, even those who do qualify for these facilities still use the 
iqqub and iddir due to the additional benefits they get from these institutions. 
Social solidarity and friendship are among such benefits. Moreover, the 
informal sector appears to have better access to information about the credit- 
worthiness of a participant than the formal sector. 
The modern financial institutions hardly exist in rural areas. However, the 
study suggests that the notion that the poor are without resources is 
questionable. The existence of large numbers of iqqubs and iddirs in the rural 
areas suggests that there is a demand for savings and lending services and 
some degree of excess liquidity. Moreover, the popularity of these institutions 
suggests that peer pressure is perhaps the best method of ensuring savings in 
poor rural communities. Both the iddir and iqqub can be used as a launching 
pad for modern financial institutions in the rural areas. 
The semi-formal sector, savings and credit co-operatives, could form a 
bridge between the formal and informal sectors. For example, the expansion 
of the savings and credit co-operatives may reduce the importance of the 
small-scale iqqubs in urban areas. In the long run, it may be possible to 
establish a form of sustainable intermediate financial technology on the basis 
of existing culturally appropriate institutions. 
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The informal sector in Ethiopia has evolved, through trial and enor and 
without government assistance, into a set of complex and well-organized 
financial institutions capable of developing self-adjusting mechanisms in the 
face of changing circumstances. The resilience and apparent expansion of the 
informal sector, however, should perhaps not be ascribed to the growth in the 
economy but rather to the ever-growing economic and social difficulties 
prevailing in the country. 
With appropriate government policies it may be possible gradually to 
transform existing 'traditional' financial institutions into modern ones. An 
increase in deposit interest rate, for example, may encourage people to keep 
iqqub money in the bank. The big traders' iqqub, for example, has the 
potential for developing into a banking system. The Ethiopian Teachers' 
Association iddir is already attaining the status of a medium-size insurance 
enterprise. 
The realization of the potential of existing informal (and semi-formal) 
financial institutions depends, to a great extent, on the degree of 
appropriateness and effectiveness of government policies. Existing policy 
constraints need to be removed. More government support should be given, to 
the iqqub, iddir and credit co-operatives. Both iqqub and iddir need legal 
protection from embezzlement and mismanagement by swindlers. The by-laws 
and book-keeping systems of these institutions should be updated and 
systematized. 
This paper has attempted to throw some light on the efficiency and 
dynamism of a component of Ethiopia's hidden economy, the informal 
financial sector. Policy makers should create an enabling environment rather 
than stifling the energies and creativities of people participating in these 
indigenous and culturally appropriate financial institutions. 
The following issues can be identified as agenda items for future research: 
1. When did the iqqub and iddir actually originate, and how did they evolve 
into their present form? 
2. What are the coping mechanisms adopted by the informal sector to 
withstand the stifling policies of a socialist-orientated government? 
3. What additional benefits do households get by simultaneously participating 
in different types of informal, semi-formal and formal financial institutions? 
4. What are the contributions of the informal sector to domestic savings and 
to the promotion of small enterprises? 
5. How does the formal sector perform relative to the informal sector? 
6. Do senior officials working in banking and insurance enterprises participate 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Rural credit, averaging birr 20 per household, was put to both 
productive (29%) and non-productive (71%) uses. The proportion of 
farmers using credit ranged from 21% in Illubabor Province to 41% in 
Arsi Province. This credit was used, in order of importance, for 
agricultural inputs (27%), food (24.8%), clothing (12.4%), 
social/religious (10.7%), medical (9.9%) and for payment of taxes and 
debts (9.8%) (Ministry of Agriculture, 1984, pp. 117-21). 
2. In this study we will use the term informal rather than 'non- 
institutional' or 'unorganized' financial market. The justification for 
using the term informal is aptly given by Chandavaskar (1985): 
The term informal is arguably more logical and descriptive than 
either 'unorganized' (since it can be as organized in its own way 
as the organized sector) or 'non-institutional' (since there are 
also institutions in the non-institutional sector). In many respects, 
its distinguishing characteristic, which is also its primary 
economic rationale, is the informal nature of its financial 
activities. It is the extent of its informality that confers 
differential economic advantages over the institutional sector. 
3. Marxists consider money lenders simply as exploiters; for example, 
Ernest Mandel asserted that 'when money economy becomes 
widespread, usurer's capital in the strict sense loses its preponderant 
position and retreats to the dark corners of society, where it survives 
for centuries at the expense of the small man' (1962, p. 102). 
4. The iqqub is spelt in different ways in the literature; for example, as 
iqub (in Pankhurst and Endreas Eshete, 1958), as equb (in Comhaire, 
1966; Alemayehu Seifu, 1969; Baker, 1986; Aspen, 1989; Levine, 
1972), as ekub (in Mauri, 1987), as ikub (in Girma Begashaw, 1978). 
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In this study, we spell it as iqqub as per personal communication with 
experts in linguistics. Similar arguments apply to the iddir (see below). 
5. Some scholars argue that the iqqub as well as the iddir were first 
practised by the Gurage people of Ethiopia (Levine, 1972; Pankhurst 
and Endreas Eshete, 1958; Mamo Wudneh, 1983, p. 5). 
6. The Bank of Abyssinia issued the first bank notes in 19 14/15 (Belay 
Gidey, 1987, p. 55). 
7. The Insurance Corporation's plan was to cover contributions due to 
individual members in the event of the death of members of an iqqub. 
According to personal communications with the relevant department of 
the Corporation, not a single iqqub has so far responded to the scheme. 
8. This information refers to the biggest of the iqqubs that a respondent 
may have joined during the reference period. 
9. The author would like to thank the PPDE Project of the IDR of Addis 
Ababa University for providing assistance towards the undertaking of 
the survey required for this section. 
10. The forest land consists mainly of gesho (a type of bush used for 
brewing local beer) and eucalyptus trees grown for sale in the nearby 
Debre-Sina town. The annual proceeds from sales of gesho alone run 
into hundreds of bin per member of the co-operative. 
11. 'Villagization' refers to a scheme by which rural households, formerly 
living in dispersed settlements, are transferred to nuclear settlements as 
a result of the government's policy of re-organizing existing rural 
settlement patterns. So far, about one-third of the total rural population 
has been transferred to the nuclear villages. Those households who 
have moved to the nuclear villages are referred to as 'villagized' 
households. 
12. The list of farmers delivering grain to the Agricultural Marketing 
Corporation in 1988-89 was used to identify 'active farmers'. Such 
farmers number about 144. 
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13. Banks provide iddir with security against robbers, some degree of 
protection against embezzlement and interest on time savings (6% per 
annum). 
14. A community iddir is different from other types of iddir. It consists of 
heterogeneous groups of people living within a given geographical area; 
it is recognized by the authorities concerned; and it often has its own 
tent and store house. 
15. The distinguishing feature of a family iddir is that membership is either 
limited to blood relatives or involves participation of both husbands 
and wives. Food and drinks are often served on the occasion of the 
meeting of members of a family iddir. 
16. Iddirs also make contributions to the special funds often set up during 
the time of wars. For example, iddirs may surrender their tents to the 
government. 
17. Such a fast rate of growth can perhaps be attributable to the growing 
financial insecurity in the urban areas resulting from a steady rise in 
the cost of living and ever-worsening social problems. 
18. In the same month contributions collected from iddir members 
amounted to birr 6,021. The total expenses in the same month 
amounted to bin 32,821.60 (including purchase of durables, salary and 
others bin 28,691.60 -- and payments to beneficiaries from the iddir 
fund bin 4,130.00). Income from the lounge decreases during 
summer vacations. In July 1990, for example, it was bin 15,690. The 
total expenses in the same month amounted to bin 2 1,489. 
19. In the urban areas the by-laws of iddirs are quite sophisticated. One 
iddir, for example, has a by-law consisting of 23 articles and 16 pages. 
20. Details of the origins and development of SACCs at the international 
and national levels are given in Kibirige (1980, pp. 7-9); Kirsch and 
Goricke (1977, pp. 114-29); Yassin Shifa (1990, pp. 27-41); SACCDO 
(1989, pp. 5-9), and Hagos Hailu (1990, pp. 13-18). 
21. The first part of this section draws heavily on Landuber Araya (1983, 
pp. 37-54) and Yassin Shifa (1990, pp. 27-41). The development of 
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SACCs between 1970 and 1974 is treated in Kirsch and Goricke (1977, 
pp. 114-29). 
22. Of the four types of co-operatives provided by the proclamation, 
producers' co-operatives have utterly failed to develop both in urban 
and rural areas. Agricultural producers' co-operatives, for example, 
were able to cover less than 4% of the total peasant farmers before the 
decollectivization process was initiated in 1990. Service co-operatives, 
though established on a larger scale both in rural and urban areas, have 
played a limited role in the economy. Housing co-operative societies 
are limited to an insignificant number of urban dwellers. 
23. Africa's giant credit union, Harambee Savings and Credit Co-operative, 
is found in Kenya. It has 93,432 members with savings amounting to 
shillings 751 million (World Reporter, 1990; The Saver, 1990). 
24. The information for this section is obtained from the Office of the 
Savings and Credit Co-operative of Employees of Addis Ababa 
University. 
25. The data for this section is obtained from the Telecommunication 
Authority Employees' Savings and Credit Co-operative Office. 
26. SACCDO has disclosed that some SACCs are going to buy insurance 
policies for their members. The Ethiopian Insurance Corporation is 
going to be involved in the scheme (The Saver, 1990). 
27. The Decree applies to all individuals or organizations earning any sort 
of income. Similar decrees are common in Ethiopia. Contributions are 
rquired mainly for the purpose of defense and rehabilitation of victims 
of drought and famine. 
28. This section heavily draws from The Saver, 1990, and interviews with 
officials of SACCDO. 
29. This section is based upon data obtained from the Office of AAUSACC 
and the survey of employees of Addis Ababa University. 
30. There is a plan to raise the maximum loans to birr 10,000. 
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31. The accumulated profit consists mainly of interest earnings on loans, 
interest paid by banks on deposits, registration fees and miscellaneous 
incomes. 
32. But, it is interesting to note that of those who have not yet joined the 
union, many were approaching the retirement age of 55 years. 
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